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This ArTicle suggesTs A pATh To develop A principled concepTuAlizATion for copyright of 
limitations and exceptions at the international level. The paper argues that, normatively, copyright has always 
sought to reflect a balance between protection and access. It demonstrates that this balance was present to 
the minds of the negotiators of the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
and may have been somewhat overlooked in revisions of the Convention. It was ultimately replaced by a 
three-step test designed to restrict the ability of individual legislators to create limitations and exceptions. 
The article also considers the conflicts between copyright and rights such as the right to privacy, human 
rights principles of free expression and cultural diversity, the right to information, the right to education, and 
the nascent right to development, all of which imply striking a balance in intellectual property protection. 
The article begins with a historical look at the public interest foundations of the Berne Convention and its 
revisions until 1971. The article then proceeds to a conceptualization of limitations and exceptions in order 
to show the policy linkages of each type of exception and proposes a set of principles for limitations and 
exceptions. The article also examines the meaning and impact of the three-step test because it would be 
pointless, not theoretically, but from a policy perspective, to ignore the application of the test in suggesting 
international principles for limitations and exceptions.  
dAns ceT ArTicle, on propose un moyen d’élAborer une concepTuAlisATion, fondée sur des 
principes, des limites et exceptions en matière de droit d’auteur au niveau international. Dans le texte, on 
soutient que, de manière normative, le droit d’auteur a toujours cherché à refléter un équilibre entre 
protection et accès. Dans cet article, on démontre que cet équilibre était présent dans l’esprit des 
négociateurs de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques en 1886, mais 
qu’il aurait été quelque peu laissé de côté lors des révisions de la Convention. Cette préoccupation d’équilibre 
aurait finalement été remplacée par un critère en trois volets destiné à restreindre la capacité des législateurs 
individuels de créer des limites et des exceptions. Dans cet article, on examine également les conflits entre 
le droit d’auteur et d’autres droits tels que le droit à la vie privée, les principes des droits de la personne que 
sont la libre expression et la diversité culturelle, le droit à l’information, l’égalité des chances en éducation, et 
le droit naissant au développement, tous ces droits impliquant qu’il faille réaliser un équilibre en matière de 
protection de la propriété intellectuelle. Le texte débute par un aperçu historique des fondements de l’intérêt 
public de la Convention de Berne et de ses révisions jusqu’en 1971. L’article se poursuit en proposant une 
conceptualisation des limitations et exceptions afin de démontrer les liens politiques de chaque des 
exceptions et propose un ensemble de principes applicables aux limites et aux exceptions. Cet article 
examine en outre la signification et l’incidence de ce critère en trois étapes dans la mesure où il serait sans 
intérêt, non pas sur un plan théorique, mais selon une perspective de politique, de faire fi de l’application du 
critère en proposant des principes internationaux pour régir les limites et les exceptions.
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and Limitations
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(2008)	5:1&2	UOLTJ	1
Le	livre,	comme	livre,	appartient	à	l’auteur,	mais	comme	pensée,	il	appartient–
le	mot	n’est	pas	trop	vaste–au	genre	humain.	Toutes	 les	 intelligences	y	ont	
droit.	 si	 l’un	 des	 deux	 droits,	 le	 droit	 de	 l’écrivain	 et	 le	 droit	 de	 l’esprit	
humain,	devait	être	sacrifié,	ce	serait,	certes,	le	droit	de	l’écrivain,	car	l’intérêt	
public	est	notre	préoccupation	unique,	et	tous,	je	le	déclare,	doivent	passer	
avant	 nous	 […]	 Constatons	 la	 propriété	 littéraire,	 mais,	 en	 même	 temps,	
fondons	le	domaine	public.1
–Victor	hugo,	Discours d’ouverture du Congrès littéraire international de 1878 
1. InTroDuCTIon
the time has come to make copyright whole,	 to	 recognize,	 contrary	 to	
Manichean	debates	 that	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	past	 few	 years,	 that	 the	public	
interest	 requires	 the	 protection	 of	 authors	 and	 users	 of	 their	 works,	 and	 to	
recognize	that	both	authors	and	users	require	a	functioning	copyright	system.
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	
principled	conceptualization	for	copyright	of	 limitations	and	exceptions2	at	the	
international	 level.	 The	 paper	 argues	 that	 normatively,	 copyright	 has	 always	
sought	 to	 reflect	 a	 balance3	 between	 protection	 and	 what	 is	 now	 known	 as	
1.	 There	is	no	good	translation	of	this	quote	(that	I	could	find).	The	three	main	thoughts	are	as	follows:
a)	 A	book	belongs	to	its	author	but	the	ideas	belong	to	humankind.
b)	 If	either	the	right	of	the	writer	or	the	right	of	the	human	spirit	must	be	forfeited	
(“sacrificed”),	it	is	assuredly	the	right	of	the	writer	that	must	be,	because	public	
interest	is	the	sole	preoccupation	and	must	come	before	everything	else.
c)	 One	must	recognize	literary	property,	but	at	the	same	time	establish	(“found”)	
the	public	domain.	
	 Victor	Hugo,	Discours d’ouverture du Congrès littéraire international de 1878	
		 <http://www.inlibroveritas.net/lire/oeuvre1923.html>	at	pp.	5–6.	
2.	 In	this	Article,	“limitation”	refers	to	conditions	on	the	exercise	of	copyright,	including	transforming	an	
exclusive	right	into	a	right	to	remuneration	(e.g.	a	compulsory	license).	An	“exception”	is	a	full	non-
application	of	the	exclusive	right	in	a	specific	situation.	
3.	 I	am	fully	aware	that	this	term	is	imprecise.	I	will	ask	the	reader	to	bear	with	me	as	I	will	attempt	to	define	it	
later	on	in	the	paper.	
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“access”	 in	myriad	forms,	but	that	this	balance,	which	was	very	present	to	the	
minds	of	 the	 negotiators	 of	 the	 1886	Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works,4	may	have	been	somewhat	overlooked	in	revisions	of	
the	 Convention.	 It	 was	 ultimately	 replaced	 by	 a	 “test,”	 the	 three-step	 test,	
designed	to	restrict	the	ability	of	 individual	 legislators	to	create	the	limitations	
and	exceptions	used	to	maintain	this	balance.	
The	degree	of	complexity	of	the	exercise	reflects	the	fact	that	copyright	
is	increasingly	sparring	with	rights	outside	of	its	own	sphere,	such	as	the	right	to	
privacy,	 human	 rights	 principles	 of	 free	 expression	 and	 cultural	 diversity	 and	
cultural	development,	the	right	to	information,	the	right	to	education,	and	the	
nascent	 right	 to	 development,	 each	 of	 which	 implies	 striking	 a	 balance	 in	
intellectual	property	protection.	
part	2	of	this	article	begins	with	a	historical	look	at	the	public	interest	
foundations	of	the	Berne Convention	and	its	successive	revisions	until	1971.	This	
effort	to	“go	back	to	basics”	will	demonstrate	that	(a)	the	protection	of	authors	
was	instituted	internationally	in	the	public	interest;	(b)	there	is	no	contradiction	
between	 the	 protection	 of	 authors	 and	 the	 public	 interest;	 and	 (c)	 the	 public	
interest	requires	a	well-functioning	system	that	includes	appropriate	limitations	
and	exceptions.	The	analysis	will	also	show	that	 limitations	and	exceptions	are	
largely	unregulated policy space	at	the	international	level.	This	has	led	to	a	lack	
of	 uniformity	 and	 harmony	 among	 national	 and	 regional	 implementations	 of	
limitations	 and	 exceptions	 allowed	 under	 the	 main	 international	 treaties,	
especially	the	Berne Convention.			
part	2	then	proceeds	to	a	conceptualization	of	limitations	and	exceptions	
in	order	to	better	understand	the	policy	linkages	of	each	type	of	exception.	part	
2	concludes	with	a	proposed	set	of	principles	for	limitations	and	exceptions.
part	 3	 examines	 the	 meaning	 and	 impact	 of	 the	 three-step	 test	 in	
establishing	 international	 principles	 for	 limitations	 and	 exceptions.	 Originally	
conceived	 as	 a	 political	 compromise	 to	 limit	 exceptions	 to	 the	 right	 of	
reproduction	in	the	Berne Convention,	the	three-step	test	has	become	the	single	
sieve	 through	which	all,	or	almost	all,	 exceptions	 to	exclusive	copyright	 rights	
must	pass	to	be	compatible	with	the	TrIps	agreement.5	It	would	be	pointless,	
not	theoretically,	but	from	a	policy	perspective,	to	ignore	the	application	of	the	
test	in	suggesting	international	principles	for	limitations	and	exceptions.		
The	analysis	contained	in	part	3	goes	beyond	a	simple	overview	of	the	
three-step	 test	 as	 interpreted	by	WTO	dispute-settlement	panels.	 It	 examines	
also	 the	 normative	 locus	 of	 the	 test	 and	 its	 possible	 application	 directly	 in	
national	legislation.		The	article	concludes	with	a	brief	look	at	ways	in	which	the	
principles	identified	in	part	2	could	be	implemented	internationally	in	light	of	the	
constraints	imposed	by	the	three-step	test.	
4.	 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works	(9	September	1886),	1161	United Nations 
Treaty Series	3,	<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html>,	as	last	revised	at	Paris	on	
24	July	1971	and	last	amended	28	September	1979	[Berne Convention].	
5.	 World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights	(15	April	
1994),	<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf>,	(1994)	33:1	International Legal Materials	
1197,	1869	United Nations Treaty Series	299	(Marrakesh	Agreement	Establishing	the	World	Trade	
Organization,	Annex	1C)	[TRIPS	Agreement].
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2. ThE roLE of LIMITATIons AnD ExCEPTIons In  
InTErnATIonAL CoPyrIghT LAW
2.1. Current Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement 
2.1.1.	The	1886	Text	of	the	Berne Convention
the seed of the berne convention was	 sown	 by	 the	Association littéraire 
internationale,	 the	 predecessor	 of	 the	 present-day	 Association littéraire et 
artistique internationale	(aLaI).6		Its	first	president	was	the	famous	french	author	
and	human	rights	campaigner	Victor	hugo,	perhaps	the	best	known	advocate	for	
the	romantic	Movement	so	closely	associated	with	the	natural	rights	foundation	
of	authors’	rights.	romantics	saw	creative	works	as	extensions	of	their	authors.	
But	they	also	believed	in	the	power	of	individuals	to	influence	and	shape	events.	
Victor	hugo	wrote	(in	the	same	speech	excerpted	above)	that	“literature	was	the	
government	of	humankind	by	the	human	spirit.”7			
The	 traditional	 insistence	 on	 the	 filiation	 between	 authors’	 rights	 and	
romanticism	offers	an	incomplete	picture,	however,	one	that	remains	incomplete	
to	this	day.	yet,	hugo’s	words	were	abundantly	clear	;	the	sole	preoccupation	in	
protecting	the	author	was	and	is	the	public	 interest.	 It	 is	 from	this	perspective	
that	he	refers	expressly	to	the	exclusion	of	ideas	from	copyright,	a	notion	that	is	
well	 established	 in	 both	major	 (Western)	 legal	 systems.	 Two	 examples	 should	
suffice.	first,	section	102(b)	of	the	Us	Copyright Act8	excludes	ideas,	procedures,	
processes,	systems,	methods	of	operation,	concepts,	principles,	and	discoveries	
from	the	scope	of	protection.	second,	every	french	treatise	on	copyright	(literary	
and	artistic	property,	that	is)	mentions	at	least	once	that	“les idées sont de libre 
parcours”	(ideas	should	circulate	freely).9		
hugo	 also	wrote	 that	 if	 a	 conflict	 should	 arise	 between	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
author	and	those	of	“the	human	spirit,”	the	latter	should	prevail.	This	means	that	
copyright	protection	should	cease	to	apply	once	the	goal	of	maximizing	welfare	
by	ensuring	 that	 new	works	 are	 created	without	 stifling	 the	potential	 for	 new	
ones	 (i.e.	 that	 copyright	 protection	 should	 go	 no	 further	 than	 is	 required	 to	
“promote	the	progress	of	science	and	useful	arts”10).	This	would	seem	to	mesh	
rather	well	also	with	economic	analyses	of	copyright	that	look	for	a	(measurable)	
optimal	protection	point	at	which	creation	and	dissemination	of	new	works	is	not	
6.	 Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, <http://www.alai.org>
7.	 “La	littérature,	c’est	le	gouvernement	du	genre	humain	par	l’esprit	humain.”	Hugo	“Discours,”	supra note	1 
at	p.	3.
8.	 US Copyright Law,	(1976)	17	United States Code	512,	90:2	United States Statutes at Large	2541,	<http://
www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.pdf>,	at	s.	102(b)	[US Copyright Act].
9.	 For	example,	in	André	Lucas	and	Henri-Jacques	Lucas,	Traité	de la propriété littéraire et artistique,	3d	ed.	
(Litec,	2006)	the	authors	explain:	“C’est	un	principe	fondamental	du	droit	de	la	propriété	intellectuelle	que	
les	idées	sont	en	elles-mêmes	de	libre	parcours.	La	règle	a	été	présentée	comme	une	concession	à	l’intérêt	
de	la	société”	(no.	28	at	p.	31).
10.	 Constitution of the United States of America (1787),	<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/usconst.
aspml>	at	art.	1,	s.	8.	See	also	Jane	Ginsburg,	“A	Tale	of	Two	Copyrights:	Literary	property	in	Revolutionary	
France	and	America,”	(1990)	64	Tulane Law Review	991–1032,	at	p.	992.
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negated	by	deadweight	and	other	welfare	losses.11	
The	 translation	of	 this	 foundational	 role	of	 the	public	 interest	 thus	was	 to	
protect	authors	for	the	personal	contribution	that	they	make	to	humankind	and	
the	development	of	human	“intelligence,”	while	putting	limits	on	such	protection	
when	so	required	 in	the	public	 interest,	 that	 is,	when	the	public	 interest	 (once	
again,	the	sole	consideration)	no	longer	dictates	protecting	a	writer’s	rights.
The	1886	text	of	the	Convention	arguably	met	this	objective.	Its	normative	
content	was	minimalist.	 Its	basic	premise	was	to	ensure	that	authors	who	were	
nationals	of	 countries	 that	would	accede	 to	 the	new	 treaty	and	 thus	 form	 the	
“Berne	 Union”	 would	 be	 protected	 in	 all	 countries	 of	 the	 Union	 without	
discrimination,	 according	 to	 the	 well-known	 principle	 of	 national	 treatment.	
Otherwise,	 the	 original	 text	 of	 the	 Convention	 only	 contained	 a	 right	 of	
translation.12
2.1.2.	The	Berne Convention	Between	1886	and	1971
The	evolution	of	the	Berne Convention,	which	has	been	revised	seven	times	(the	
last	in	1971),	has	proceeded	along	a	single	axis,	namely	towards	the	recognition	
of	new	rights.	The	most	fundamental	right,	the	right	of	reproduction,	was	mostly	
taken	 for	 granted,	 as	 it	 were,	 because	 it	 was	 fully	 incorporated	 only	 at	 the	
stockholm	revision	of	1967,13	although	it	had	existed	in	national	laws	for	decades	
before	 that,	 starting	with	 the	 Statute of Anne of 1710.14	 	 It	 would	 be	 untrue,	
however,	to	say	that	the	original	text	did	not	at	least	implicitly	recognize	a	right	
of	reproduction.	first,	the	text	referred	to	“infringing	copies,”	which	were	“liable	
to	 seizure	 on	 importation.”15	 It	 also	 contained	 a	 right	 of	 reproduction	 for	
newspapers	or	periodicals	but	the	right	only	applied	if	specifically	asserted	by	the	
author.16	 More	 importantly,	 the	 1886	 text	 contained	 a	 partial	 definition	 of	
“unlawful	 reproductions	 to	which	 this	Convention	 applies,”	which	 interestingly,	
included	
11.	 Landes	and	Posner	provide	a	classic	statement:	
Copyright	protection	[…]	trades	off	the	costs	of	limiting	access	to	a	work	against	the	benefits	of	
providing	 incentives	 to	 create	 the	work	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Striking	 the	 correct	 balance	between	
access	 and	 incentives	 is	 the	 central	 problem	 in	 copyright	 law.	 For	 copyright	 law	 to	 promote	
economic	 efficiency,	 its	 principal	 legal	 doctrines	 must,	 at	 least	 approximately,	 maximize	 the	
benefits	from	creating	additional	works	minus	both	the	losses	from	limiting	access	and	the	costs	of	
administering	copyright	protection.	
	 William	M.	Landes	and	Richard	A.	Posner,	“An	Economic	Analysis	of	Copyright	Law,”	(1989)	18:2	Journal of 
Legal Studies	325–363	at	p.	326.
12.	 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9	September	1886)	[Berne Convention 
1886]	in	Berne Convention Centenary (WIPO,	1986),	arts.	5	and	6,	at	p.	228.	The	term	of	protection	was	ten	
years.		Arguably,	a	right	of	reproduction	was	implied	because	the	original	text	contained	exceptions	(see	
section	2.1.2).	Additionally,	there	is	an	indirect	reference	to	the	public	performance	of	protected	works	
(there	is	an	exclusive	right	in	the	public	performance	of	translations)	in	Article	9.
13.	 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (14	July	1967),	828	United	Nations	Treaty	
Series	11850	(revised	in	Stockholm	on	14	July	1967),	<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_
wo001.html>	[Stockholm Revision]	at	pp.	232–234.	It	is	also	at	the	1967	Stockholm	Revision	Conference	that	
the	three-step	test,	to	which	I	return	below,	made	it	into	the	Berne Convention.		
14.	 Copyright Act,	(1709)	8	Anne	c.	19,	<http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html>	[Statute of Anne].
15.	 Berne Convention	1886, supra	note	12,	art.	12(1),	at	p.	228.
16.	 Berne Convention	1886, supra	note	12,	art.	7	at	p.	228.
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unauthorized	 indirect	 appropriations	of	 a	 literary	or	 artistic	work	of	 various	
kinds,	such	as	adaptations,	musical	arrangements,	etc.,	when	they	are	only	the	
reproduction	 of	 a	 particular	 work,	 in	 the	 same	 form,	 or	 in	 another	 form,	
without essential alterations, additions, or abridgements, so as not to present 
the character of a new original work.17	
There	is	much	that	could	be	said	about	this	provision.		In	fact,	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	I	will	suggest	that	copyright	law	must	be	substantially	revisited	is	the	scope	
of	the	right	of	adaptation	(or	the	right	to	make	“derivative	works”).		This	idea	will	
be	partly	discussed	in	the	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	three-step	test,	below.
put	another	way,	apart	from	a	limited	right	of	reproduction	and	a	right	
of	public	representation	for	“dramatic	and	dramatico-musical	works,”18	the	most	
important	 provision	 of	 the	 original	 Berne Convention	 was	 the	 inclusion	 of	
national	treatment.	There	were	also	references	to	exceptions,	including	for	the	
reproduction	 of	 “articles	 of	 political	 discussion,	 […]	 news	 of	 the	 day	 or	
miscellaneous	facts,”	which	could	not	be	prohibited,19	and	for	“use	in	publications	
for	 teaching	 or	 scientific	 purposes,	 or	 for	 chrestomathies.”20	 Interestingly,	 the	
few	exceptions,	 including	 the	only	mandatory	one	 (news	of	 the	day,	 facts	and	
“articles	 of	 political	 discussion”)21	 contained	 in	 the	 Berne Convention	 clearly	
reflected	public	 interest	considerations.	 In	what	seems	a	precursor	 to	debates	
about	 the	 manufacture	 of	 tools	 to	 circumvent	 Technical	 protection	 Measures	
(TpMs),22	a	protocol	to	the	1886	text	provided	that	the	manufacture	and	sale	of	
“instruments	for	the	mechanical	reproduction	of	musical	works	in	which	copyright	
subsists	 shall	 not	 be	 considered	 as	 constituting	 an	 infringement	 of	 musical	
copyright.”23
The	pattern	of	 evolution	of	 the	Convention	was	 then	 fairly	 linear.	 for	
forms	of	exploitation	invented	after	1886,	new	rights	were	added	at	successive	
revision	Conferences,	as	well	as	a	few	exceptions.	Without	providing	a	complete	
list,	here	are	some	of	the	principal	milestones.	
17.	 Berne Convention 1886,	supra	note	12,	art.	10(1)	at	p.	228	(emphasis	added).
18.	 Berne Convention 1886,	supra	note	12,	art.	9(2).
19.	 Berne Convention 1886,	supra	note	12,	art.	7(2).	
20.	 Berne Convention 1886,	supra	note	12,	art.	8.	This	provision	allowed	only	national	legislation	to	maintain	
exceptions.	
21.	 The	other	exceptions	are	permissive.
22.	 Technological	tools	used	to	restrict	the	use	of	and/or	access	to	a	work.
23.	 Berne Convention 1886,	supra	note	12,	Final Protocol of September 9, 1886,	art	3.
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Table 1.	Evolution of Rights, Limitations and Exceptions in the Berne	Convention24
Paris (1896) •	 extension	of	reproduction	right	
to	serial	novels	(must	be	
asserted,	IV)
•	 right	of	adaptation	applied	
specifically	to	transformation	of	a	
novel	into	a	theatrical	play	and	
vice	versa
Berlin (1908) •	 Term	of	protection	of	life	+	50	
years	(7)
•	 Broader	translation	right	(8)
•	 removal	of	need	to	assert	
reproduction	right	in	serial	novels	
and	short	stories
•	 new	right	of	adaption	for	
mechanical	reproduction	and	
public	performance	using	such	
reproductions	(13)
•	 extension	of	right	to	obtain	
seizure	to	such		adaptations	
(13(4))
•	 new	right	of	reproduction	and		
public	performance	by	
cinematography	(14)	
•	 possible	conditions	and	restrictions	on	
mechanical	reproduction	right	(13)
rome (1928) •	 Moral	right	(6bis,	9(2),	11bis(2))
•	 new	exclusive	right	of	
communication	by	broadcasting	
(11bis(1))
•	 possible	exclusion	from	protection	of	
political	speeches	and	speeches	in	
legal	proceedings	(2bis(1))
•	 possible	limit	on	right	of	reproduction	
of	lectures,	addresses	and	sermons	
(2bis(2))
•	 possible	limit	on	the	right	of	
communication	by	broadcasting,	
including	compulsory	licenses	(11bis(2))
Brussels (1948) •	 Broader	right	of	translation	(8)
•	 Broader	moral	right	(in	
quotations,	10(3))
•	 extension	of	public	performance	
right	to	communications	to	the	
public	of	the	performance	(11(1))
•	 extension	of	communication	right	
to	broadcasting	or	
communication	by	any	other	
means	of	wireless	diffusion	of	
signs,	sounds	and	images;	any	
communication	to	the	public	by	
wire	(cable)	or	rebroadcasting;	
and	public	communication	by	
loudspeaker	(11bis(1))
•	 new	right	of	public	recitation	
(11ter)
•	 Broader	right	of	adaptation,	
arrangement	and	other	alteration	
(elimination	of	reference	to	new	
original	work	as	being	excluded,	12)
•	 Broader	right	in	cinematographic	
adaptations	(now	includes	
distribution	as	well	as	public	
performance,	14)
•	 new	droit de suite	(resale	right,	
14bis(1))
•	 Mandatory	right	of	quotation	(10(1))
•	 possible	exception	to	use	excerpts		in	
educational	and	scientific	publications	
(10(2));	replaces	previous	possibility	of	
maintaining	existing	exceptions
•	 possible	exception	for	the	recording,	
reproduction	and	public	communication	
of	short	extracts	for	the	purpose	of	
reporting	current	events	(10bis)
•	 possible	conditions	(incl.	compulsory	
license)	on	broader	communication	
right	(11bis(2))
•	 possible	exception	for	ephemeral	
recoding	and	official	archiving	(11bis(3))	
•	 possible	limit	on	resale	right	(14bis	(2))
24.	 Not	included	in	this	table	are	(a)	extensions	of	the	protection	to	new	types	of	works	(photography,	works	of	
applied	art,	cinematography,	etc.);	(b)	definitional	changes	(what	is	“published”	etc.);	(c)	dispute-settlement	
(including	a	limited	right	to	retaliate	for	failure	to	protect);	and	(d)	administrative	provisions.	
rEvIsIon or ProToCoL  
(yEAr)
nEW LIMITATIons or ExCEPTIons 
(ArTICLE)
nEW rIghTs (ArTICLE)
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stockholm (1967) •	 new/	broader	right	of	
reproduction	(all	categories	of	
works,	9(1))
•	 news	reporting	reproduction	
exception	may	be	excluded	by	
rightsholder	(10bis(1))
•	 Broader	right	of	public	
performance	and	communication	
(reservations	no	longer	
mentioned,	11)
•	 new	right	of	public	
communication	of	a	recitation;	
right	extended	to	translations	
(11ter)
•	 right	of	performance	for	
cinematographic	works	extended	
to	communication	by	wire	(14bis)
•	 Three-step	test	(9(2))
•	 possible	limits	on	protection	of	official	
texts	(2(4))
•	 right	of	quotation	extended	to	all	
works	but	must	be	compatible	with	fair	
practice	and	the	extent	of	use	must	be	
justified	by	purpose	(10(1))
•	 Modification	of	educational	exception,	
limited	to	“by	way	of	illustration”		and	
compatibility	with	“fair	practice”	but	
applied	also	to	broadcasts	and	
recordings	(not	just	publications,	10(2))
•	 newspaper	/	periodicals	reproduction	
exception	now	applies	to	broadcasting	
and	communication	and	to	publications	
on	“economic,	political	or	religious	
topics”	(10bis(1))
•	 exception	for	reporting	current	events	
by	photography,	cinematography,	
broadcasting	or	communication	to	the	
public	limited	to	“the	extent	justified	
by	the	informatory	purpose”	(10bis(2))
Paris (1971) •	 new	appendix	(providing	developing	
countries	with	the	possibility	of	issuing	
compulsory	reproduction	and	
translation	licenses,	subject	to	a	
complex	administrative	machinery)	
 
This	 table	 shows	 that	 new	 rights	were	 created	 to	 recognize	 that	 some	works,	
especially	 theatrical,	 musical	 and	 cinematographic,	 derive	 most	 of	 their	
commercial	 value	 from	 their	 public	 performance	 (live)	 or	 communication	
(distance).	 When	 exceptions	 or	 limitations	 were	 provided	 together	 with	 new	
rights,	the	exceptions	and	limitations	were	often	unspecified	possibilities	offered	
to	 national	 legislators.	 In	 some	 cases	 (for	 example,	 articles	 11bis(2)	 and	 13),	
those	limitations	have	generally	taken	the	form	of	a	compulsory	licensing	system.	
In	a	few	cases	(for	example,	the	droit de suite)),	the	right	was	introduced	into	the	
Berne Convention	“in	principle”	but	essentially	made	optional.25	
While	the	evolution	of	the	domain	of	rights	is	thus	fairly	clear,	the	same	
cannot	be	said	of	the	domain	of	exceptions,	which	remain	generally	unregulated	
space.	Most	exceptions	(excluding	the	quotation	right)	are	only	permissive;	that	
is,	Berne	member	states	may	enact	them.		
The	pinnacle	of	 this	development	was	 the	adoption	of	 the	 three-step	
test,	which	began	 its	 normative	 career	 as	 a	political	 compromise	designed	 to	
allow,	within	limited	confines,	exceptions	to	be	made	by	Berne	member	states	
to	the	right	of	reproduction,	but	has	since	become	the	cornerstone	of	exceptions	
to	all	 copyright	 rights,	as	well	as	a	number	of	 industrial	property	 rights	 in	 the	
TrIps	agreement.26	To	this	 rather	vague	test	 (as	we	will	see	below),	one	must	
include	the	addition	at	the	stockholm	Conference	of	references	to	fair	practice	
and	the	need	to	justify	the	extent	of	a	use	under	an	exception	to	the	purpose	of	
the	use,	which	thus	arguably	adds	an	evidentiary	burden	on	users.
25.	 The	same	technique	was	used	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	supra	note	5,	which	provides,	e.g.,	a	right	for	
broadcasting	organizations	(as	a	related	or	neighboring	right)	at	art.	14	but	then	makes	it	optional.	
26.	 TRIPS	Agreement, supra	note	5	at	arts.13	(all	copyright	rights),	26(2)	(industrial	designs),	and	30	(patents).		
rEvIsIon or ProToCoL  
(yEAr)
nEW LIMITATIons or ExCEPTIons 
(ArTICLE)
nEW rIghTs (ArTICLE)
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Interestingly,	the	only	mandatory	exception	is	the	quotation	right,	and	the	
only	exceptions	that	have	been	part	of	the	Berne Convention	from	its	inception	
and	 through	 the	 many	 revisions	 are	 related	 to	 news	 reporting	 and	 political	
discussion.	In	that	sense,	and	without	entering	here	in	the	debate	as	to	whether	
free	 expression	 is	 already	 fully	 factored	 into	 copyright	 norms27,	 or	 whether	
constitutional	protection	of	 free	expression28	might	 force	 copyright	holders	 to	
yield	beyond	exceptions	provided	for	in	national	laws	and	international	texts,29	
there	is	a	sense	in	the	Berne Convention	that	certain	public	interest	considerations	
related	to	information	and	the	press	trump	exclusive	copyright	rights.	
2.1.3.	Limitations	and	exceptions	are	Unregulated	space
What	 remains	 after	 the	brief	historical	overview	of	 the	evolution	of	 the	Berne 
Convention	is	the	notion	that,	while	rights	are	generally	well	defined	in	the	Berne 
Convention,	 exceptions	 other	 than	 those	 related	 to	 “public	 information”	 are	
unregulated	internationally.	additionally,	most	of	those	unregulated	exceptions	
are	now	possibly	subject	to	the	further	sieve	of	the	three-step	test.	This	raises	a	
number	of	issues,	two	of	which	deserve	to	be	mentioned	here.	first,	normatively,	
the	incremental	elevation	of	the	level	of	protection	to	encompass	new	forms	of	
commercial	exploitation	of	 (mostly	 individual)	human	creativity	with	unclear	or	
unspecified	exceptions	makes	 it	harder	 to	define	proper	boundaries	 for	 those	
rights	in	a	globalized	world.	The	impact	of	this	policy	vacuum	has	been	felt	very	
palpably	 on	 the	 internet,	 where	 social	 norms	 at	 play	 are	 interfacing	 with	
exceptions	 which	 tend	 to	 be	 unclear	 at	 the	 national	 level	 and	 unspecific	
internationally.	The	need	for	enforcement	grows	with	each	degree	of	separation	
from	 those	 social	 norms	 and	 the	 resulting	 lack	 of	 internalization.30	 In	 fact,	
enforcement	and	the	perception	that	the	law	is	unduly	harsh	or	misdirected	in	its	
application	will	lead	to	more	“infringement.”	This	in	itself	is	nothing	new,31	but	
this	fairly	obvious	observation	has	taken	on	new	meaning	on	the	internet.
27.	 See	Michael	D	Birnhack,	“Global	Copyright,	Local	Speech,”	(2006)	24:2	Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law 
Journal	491–547,	<http://works.bepress.com/michael_birnhack/1/>;	Neil	W	Netanel,	Copyright’s Paradox	
(Oxford	University	Press,	2008)	109–152.	
28.	 See	L	Ray	Patterson,	“Free	Speech,	Copyright	and	Fair	Use,”	(1987)	40:1	Vanderbilt Law Review	1–66.	
29.	 See	Daniel	J	Gervais,	“The	Role	of	International	Treaties	in	the	Interpretation	of	Canadian	Intellectual	
Property	Statutes,”	in	Oonagh	E	Fitzgerald,	ed.,	The Globalized Rule of Law: Relationships Between 
International and Domestic Law	(Irwin	Law,	2006)	549–572.
30.	 See	Daniel	J	Gervais,	“The	Price	of	Social	Norms:	Towards	A	Liability	Regime	for	File-Sharing,”	(2004)	12:1	
Journal of Intellectual Property Law 39–73,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=525083>.	As	Confucius	stated	long	
ago	in	the	Analects:	“The	Master	said,	‘If	the	people	be	led	by	laws,	and	uniformity	sought	to	be	given	
them	by	punishments,	they	will	try	to	avoid	the	punishment,	but	have	no	sense	of	shame.	If	they	be	led	by	
virtue,	and	uniformity	sought	to	be	given	them	by	the	rules	of	propriety,	they	will	have	the	sense	of	shame,	
and	moreover	will	become	good.”	Confucius,	The Analects of Confucius, trans.	James	Legge,	<http://etext.
library.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a/complete.html>,	book	II,	no.	3	at	p.	88.		
31. In	a	speech	delivered	in	the	House	of	Commons	(UK)	5	February	1841,	<http://yarchive.net/macaulay/
copyright.html>,	Thomas	Babington	Macaulay	declared:
Those	who	 invade	 copyright	 are	 regarded	as	 knaves	who	 take	 the	bread	out	of	 the	mouths	of	
deserving	men.	Everybody	 is	well	pleased	to	see	them	restrained	by	the	 law,	and	compelled	to	
refund	 their	 ill-gotten	gains.	No	 tradesman	of	 good	 repute	will	 have	 anything	 to	 do	with	 such	
disgraceful	 transactions.	 Pass	 this	 law:	 and	 that	 feeling	 is	 at	 end.	 	Men	 very	 different	 from	 the	
present	race	of	piratical	booksellers	will	soon	infringe	this	intolerable	monopoly.	Great	masses	of	
capital	will	be	constantly	employed	in	the	violation	of	the	law.	Every	art	will	be	employed	to	evade	
legal	pursuit;	and	the	whole	nation	will	be	in	the	plot.	[…]	Remember	too	that,	when	once	it	ceases	
to	be	considered	as	wrong	and	discreditable	to	invade	literary	property,	no	person	can	say	where	
the	invasion	will	stop.
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In	the	1996 WIPO	Copyright Treaty	(WCT),32	there	are	two	references	to	the	
need	for	balance,	including	one	in	the	preamble,	which	refers	back	to	the	Berne 
Convention:	“Recognizing the	need	to	maintain	a	balance	between	the	rights	of	
authors	and	the	larger	public	interest,	particularly	education,	research	and	access	
to	 information,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 Berne Convention	 […].”33	 The	 WCT	 also	
incorporates	 the	 three-step	 test	 as	 a	 limit	 to	 permitted	 limitations	 and	
exceptions,34	but	an	agreed	statement	to	that	article	provides	that	it	“neither	
reduces	nor	extends	the	scope	of	applicability	of	the	limitations	and	exceptions	
permitted	by	the	Berne Convention.”35	This	statement	would	support	the	view	
that	the	three-step	test	does	not	constitute	an	additional	limit	on	limitations	and	
exceptions.	 as	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 it	 may,	 however,	 serve	 as	 a	 guide	 to	 their	
interpretation.			
a	second	question	stems	from	the	lack	of	clarity	itself.	for	the	first	time	in	
copyright’s	 300-year-	 history,36	 individual	 end-users,	 who	 until	 recently	 have	
rarely	 had	 encounters	 with	 copyright	 law	 (no	 one	 need	 sign	 a	 license	 when	
buying	a	copy	of	a	book	at	a	bookstore	or	a	CD	at	a	record	store),	suddenly	have	
to	 learn	 rules	 about	what	 they	 can	 or	 cannot	 do	 legally	 with	 pictures,	music,	
videos,	 images,	 etc.	 Many	 users	 feel	 that	 restrictions	 on	 use	 of	 copyrighted	
material	on	the	internet	are	at	odds	with	established	practices	of	non-commercial	
“sharing”	 and	 reusing	 of	 content,	 often	 done	 to	 create	 something	 new—a	
phenomenon	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	“remix	culture”—a	form	of	which	is	
user-generated	 content	 (UGC).37	 educators,	 who	 draw	 considerable	 benefits	
from	the	great	global	library	that	is	the	internet,	are	pointing	to	the	lack	of	clarity	
or	 technological	 adaptability	 of	 exceptions.	 for	 example	 in	 the	 Canadian	
Copyright Act,	uses	covered	by	educational	exceptions	are	generally	limited	to	
the	physicality	of	the	use	(which	must	be	“on	the	premises”	of	the	educational	
establishment).38	 authors	 and	 other	 rightsholders	 also	 stand	 to	 lose	 because	
users	may	refuse	to	engage,	lest	they	partake	in	the	emergence	of	a	definitional	
process	that	could	result	 in	a	broadening	of	 the	scope	of	uses	that	 require	an	
authorization	(i.e.	beyond	applicable	exceptions	and	limitations).
The	lack	of	clarity	follows	in	significant	part	from	the	fact	that	limitations	and	
exceptions	 remain	 mostly	 unregulated	 space	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 an	
empirical	study	of	limitations	and	exceptions	in	place	in	the	various	national	legal	
systems	would	provide	an	interesting	mosaic	of	exceptions,	if	only	because	some	
32.	 WIPO Copyright Treaty	(20	December	1996),	<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html>,	
(1997)	36	International Legal Materials	65	(entry	into	force	on	6	March	2002)	[WCT].
33.	 WCT,	supra note	32,	preamble,	last	paragraph.
34.	 WCT,	supra note	32,	art.	10(2).
35.	 WCT,	supra note	32,	Agreed	Statement	concerning	art.	10,	2d	paragraph,	in	Agreed	Statements	
Concerning	the	WIPO	Copyright	Treaty,	adopted	by	the	Diplomatic	Conference	on	20	December	1996,	
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html>.
36.	 Counted	from	the	Statute of Anne,	supra	note	14.
37.	 I	would	take	issue—but	it	is	not	the	focus	of	this	paper—with	that	expression.	If	original	content	is	
generated,	then	it	is	generated	by	an	author,	not	a	“user.”	All	authors	are,	in	one	form	or	another,	users	of	
previous	“content.”	Don’t	we	all	stand	“on	the	shoulder	of	giants”?		Whether	reuse	resulting	in	the	creation	
of	a	new	copyright	work	amounts	to	the	creation	of	a	derivative	work—and	then	whether	it	is	covered	by	an	
exception	(such	as	fair	use	in	the	United	States)—are	distinct	issues.	
38.	 Copyright Act,	(1985)	Revised Statutes of Canada	ch.	C–42,	<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42>	ss.	29.4,	
29.5,	29.6	and	30.3	[Copyright Act].
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are	expressed	in	ways	that	are	very	specific,39	while	others	are	there	essentially	
to	 provide	 criteria	 and	 guidance	 to	 courts	 called	 upon	 to	 decide	 whether	 a	
particular	 use	 is	 infringing.40	 If	 a	 common	 denominator	 could	 be	 found,	 this	
exercise	 might	 provide	 a	 basis	 to	 argue	 that	 a	 “subsequent	 practice	 in	 the	
application	of	the	treaty	which	establishes	the	agreement	of	the	parties	regarding	
[the]	interpretation	[of	the	Berne Convention]”	has	emerged	according	to	article	
31(3)(b)	of	the	Vienna Convention.41
Copyright,	whether	viewed	as	an	economic	lever,	a	utilitarian	construct,42	or	
a	natural	rights-based	doctrine,	intrinsically	requires	balance	to	achieve	its	stated	
objective.	from	an	economic	perspective,	the	protection	needs	to	be	sufficient	
to	generate	new	works	and	ensure	optimal	(not	necessarily	maximal)	commercial	
dissemination	(where	applicable)	without	endangering	the	creation	of	new	works	
or	generating	unreasonable	welfare	 costs.	a	utilitarian	analysis	 leads	one	 to	a	
similar	conclusion:	protection	is	required	to	achieve	the	objective	of	generating	
robust	 copyright	 industries	and	well-functioning	markets	 for	 informational	 and	
ideational	 objects,	 including	 public	 information	 and	 entertainment	 without	
stifling	the	emergence	of	new	works	or	access.	Victor	hugo	argued	that	copyright	
and	the	public	interest	must	go	hand-in-hand,	and	that	protection	must	go	only	
as	far	as	the	public	interest	(which	includes	the	protection	of	authors)	will	dictate.
	
	
39.	 For	example,	s.	29.5	of	the	Copyright Act,	supra	note	38:	
	 It	is	not	an	infringement	of	copyright	for	an	educational	institution	or	a	person	acting	under	its	
authority	to	do	the	following	acts	if	they	are	done	on	the	premises	of	an	educational	institution	
for	educational	or	training	purposes	and	not	for	profit,	before	an	audience	consisting	primarily	
of	 students	 of	 the	 educational	 institution,	 instructors	 acting	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	
educational	institution	or	any	person	who	is	directly	responsible	for	setting	a	curriculum	for	the	
educational	institution:	
(a)	the	live	performance	in	public,	primarily	by	students	of	the	educational	institution,	of	a	work.
	 Another	example	might	be	Article	6	of	EC,	European Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the 
legal protection of computer programs,	[1991]	Official Journal of the European Union	L	122,		
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31991L0250:EN:HTML>	[Computer 
Programs Directive],	which	provides	a	very	specific	right	to	decompile	(reverse	engineer)	software.
40.	 A	good	example	of	course	is	s.	107	of	the	US Copyright Act, supra	note	8,	which	provides	four	criteria,	
codified	in	1976	from	case	law,	to	decide	whether	a	particular	use	which	is	other	wise	infringing	is	“fair	use.”	
The	criteria	are:	
(1)		 the	 purpose	 and	 character	 of	 the	 use,	 including	 whether	 such	 use	 is	 of	 a	 commercial	
nature	or	is	for	nonprofit	educational	purposes;	
(2)			 the	nature	of	the	copyrighted	work;	
(3)				 the	amount	and	substantiality	of	the	portion	used	in	relation	to	the	copyrighted	work	as	a	
whole;	and	
(4)			 the	effect	of	the	use	upon	the	potential	market	for	or	value	of	the	copyrighted	work.	
41.	 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties	(23	May	1969),	<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf>,	1155	United Nations Treaty Series	331,	(1969)	8	International Legal 
Materials	679	(entry	into	force	27	January	1980)	[Vienna Convention].		
42.	 Which	I	see	as	having	a	broader,	if	less	measurable,	purview	than	economic	theory.	
	 Copyright	also	is	intended	to	support	a	system,	a	macrocosm,	in	which	authors	and	publishers	
compete	for	the	attention	and	favor	of	the	public.	[…]	The	argument	for	copyright	here,	to	be	
sure,	is	an	argument	of	utility—but	not	mere	economic	utility.	Utility	is	found	in	the	fostering	of	
a	pluralism	of	opinion,	experience,	vision,	and	utterance	within	the	world	of	authors.	[…]	[O]ur	
freedom	depends	not	only	on	freedom	for	a	few,	but	also	on	variety,	regardless	of	the	ultimate	
commingling	of	truth	and	error.	Copyright	fosters	that	variety.
	 David	Ladd,	“The	Harm	of	the	Concept	of	Harm	in	Copyright,”	(1982-1983)	30	Journal of the Copyright 
Society of the USA	421–432,	at	pp.	427–428.	Mr.	Ladd	was	the	Register	of	Copyrights	of	the	United	States	
from	1980	until	1985.
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2.1.4.	human	rights	analysis
a	human	rights	analysis	would	 lead	one	to	 the	same	conclusion	of	a	need	 for	
balance.	as	rené	Cassin	noted,	“human	beings	can	claim	rights	by	the	fact	of	
their	 creation.”43	 article	 27	 of	 the	 Universal Declaration on Human Rights	
(UDhr),44	which	saw	the	light	of	day	238	years	after	the	Statute of Anne,	protects	
both	 the	authors’	 right	 to	 the	protection	of	 their	moral	 and	material	 interests	
resulting	from	scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production	and	users’	rights	freely	to	
participate	in	the	cultural	life	of	the	community,	to	enjoy	the	arts	and	to	share	in	
scientific	advancement	and	its	benefits.	The	objective	of	protection	embraces,	at	
least	 indirectly,	 the	moral	 desert	 theory	 (protection	of	 interests	 resulting	 from	
scientific,	literary	or	artistic	production),	while	the	objective	of	access	is	expressed	
teleologically	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 allow	 everyone	 to	 enjoy	 the	 arts	 and	 to	 share	 in	
scientific	advancement	and	its	benefits.		
a	 human	 rights	 approach	 brings	 values	 to	 the	 copyright	 system.	 for	
example,	the	emphasis	on	a	somewhat	amorphous	right	to	promote	culture	and	
cultural	 diversity	 complements	 the	 economic	 analysis	 and	 theory	 as	 a	 policy-
making	 machine.	 as	 professor	 Julie	 Cohen	 suggests,	 copyright	 needs	 a	
substantive	balance,	which	
concerns	the	ways	in	which	copyright’s	goal	of	creating	economic	fixity	must	
accommodate	its	mission	to	foster	cultural	play.	economic	analysis	can	help	
us	to	understand	some	of	the	considerations	relevant	to	the	balance	between	
economic	fixity	and	cultural	mobility,	but	both	valuation	and	incommensurability	
problems	 prevent	 a	 comprehensive	 summing	 of	 the	 relevant	 costs	 and	
benefits.	Modeling	the	benefits	of	artistic	and	intellectual	flux	is	hard	to	do.45		
Copyright’s	“mission	to	foster	cultural	play”	may	then	be	read	against	
the	backdrop	of	articles	27(1)	of	the	UDhr	and	15	of	the	International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,46	which	enshrine	the	right	to	participate	
in	 cultural	 life.	 “Cultural	 Life	 must	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 benefit	 to	 which	 every	
member	of	the	community	is	entitled.		Culture	must	not	be	viewed	as	an	esoteric	
activity	of	a	superior	social	elite.”47
from	 copyright’s	 viewpoint,	 culture	 is	 a	 two-way	 street:	 it	 provides	 the	
essential	substratum	upon	which	all	creators	draw	to	create,	and	their	creations	
in	turn	feed	and	expand	the	culture.	The	phenomenon	has	taken	on	an	additional	
layer	of	complexity	with	 the	globalization	of	Web	culture,	but	a	 lot	of	cultural	
resonance	remains	local.	“Individual	creators	begin	with	situatedness	and	work	
through	culture	to	arrive	at	the	unexpected.”48
43.	 Quoted	in	M	Vivant, “Authors’	Rights,	Human	Rights?”,	(1997)	174	Revue internationale du droit d’auteur	
(RIDA)	60	at	p.	86.	
44.	 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10	December	1948),	UN,	General Assembly Resolution	217A	(III),	
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>,	(1948)	United Nations	Doc.	A/810	art.	27	at	p.	71.
45.	 Julie	Cohen,	“Creativity	and	Culture	in	Copyright	Theory,”	(2007)	40:3	University of California Davis Law 
Review	1151–1205,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=929527>	at	p.	1196.
46.	 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,	(16	December	1966)	UN,	General 
Assembly Resolution	2200A	(XXI),	<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm>,	993	United Nations 
Treaty Series	4	(entry	into	force	3	January	1976)	art.	15.
47.	 Yoram	Dinstein,	“Cultural	Rights,”	(1979)	9	Israel Yearbook on Human Rights	58–81,	at	p.	76.	
48.	 Cohen,	“Creativity	and	Culture”	supra	note	45	at	p.	1183.
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Copyright	 and	 culture	both	need	new	works	 to	be	 created,	 though	 for	
different	reasons	(the	former	to	justify	its	existence,	the	latter	to	grow),	and	to	
be	 created	 those	 new	 works	 need	 existing	 works.	 Conceptually,	 this	 can	 be	
framed	 as	 a	 “freedom	 to	 create,”	 which,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 at	 least,	 is	 the	
freedom	 to	 copy.	 Whether	 copying	 constitutes	 copyright	 infringement	 is	 a	
question	 of	 degree.	 professor	 françois	 Dessemontet	 has	 suggested	 a	 list	 of	
factors	to	be	taken	into	account:	(a)	whether	the	work	copied	from	fades	away	in	
the	new	work;	(b)	whether	the	first	work	is	recognizable	and	the	degree	to	which	
it	is;	and	(c)	the	proportionality	of	“newness”	(presumably	assessed	quantitatively	
but	also,	and	perhaps	mostly,	qualitatively)	to	the	amount	that	is	borrowed.49
human	rights	arguably	restore	a	degree	of	authorial	dignity	to	copyright.	
“[h]uman	beings	have	fundamental	interests,	which	should	not	be	sacrificed	for	
public	benefit,	 and	 […]	 society’s	well-being	does	not	override	 those	 interests.	
protecting	those	interests	 is	deemed	vital	for	maintaining	individual	autonomy,	
independence,	 and	 security.”50	 human	 rights,	 in	 providing	 a	 teleological	
framework	 for	 exceptions,	 can	 also	 guide	 courts51	 in	 interpreting	 whether	 a	
particular	 use	 should	 be	 covered	 by	 an	 unclear	 exception,	 and	 assist	 policy	
makers	in	designing	new	exceptions.	One	might	think	this	impossible,	owing	to	
the	presence	of	the	three-step	test	“straitjacket.”	however,	the	third	step	of	the	
test,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 allowing	 public	 interest	
considerations	(i.e.	what	constitutes	an	allowable	“justification”	for	the	exception),	
and	human	rights	principles	might	thus	inform	the	determination	of	the	proper	
scope	of	exceptions.	The	UDhr,	in	particular,	allows	exceptions	that	demonstrably	
augment	access,	where	such	access	(enjoyment)	is	not	commercially	reasonable	
or	possible,	and	the	right	to	reuse	and	thereby	participate	in	the	cultural	life	of	
the	 community.	 This	 seems	 to	 justify	 both	consumptive use	 exceptions	where	
commercial	access	is	undesirable	or	impracticable,	such	as	those	in	the	appendix	
to	the	Berne Convention	for	access	in	developing	countries,	and	exceptions	for	
transformative uses	(such	as,	but	not	limited	to,	parody),	the	principal	element	of	
the	United	states	fair	use	doctrine.52
If,	then,	copyright	intrinsically	must	be	balanced,	how	should	this	balance	
be	achieved?	Before	answering	this	question,	one	must	recognize	that	copyright	
is	facing	a	number	of	extrinsic	pressures	that	should	ideally	result	in	new	equilibria	
being	progressively	established.	Copyright’s	sparring	with	free	expression	is	not	
recent.53	nor	 is	 the	well-established	 need	 to	 limit	 copyright	when	 the	 public’s	
“right	 to	 information”	 is	 involved,	 as	 the	 Berne Convention	 recognizes	 in	 a	
49.	 François	Dessemontet,	“Copyright	and	Human	Rights,”	in	Jan	Kabel,	ed.,	Intellectual Property and 
Information Law: Essays in Honour of Herman Cohen Jehoram	(Kluwer,	1998)	113–120,	<http://www.unil.ch/
webdav/site/cedidac/shared/Articles/Copyright%20&%20Human%20Rights.pdf>.
50.	 Orit	Fischman	Afori,	“Human	Rights	and	Copyright:	The	Introduction	of	Natural	Law	Considerations	into	
American	Copyright	Law,”	(2003–2004)	14:2	Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal	497–565,	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089376>	at	p.	503.
51.	 As	was	done,	e.g.,	by	French	courts.	See	Edelman,	Note, (1989)	116:4	Journal du Droit International	1005;	
Pierre	Sirinelli,	Note, (1989)	142	Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur	301–324.	
52.	 Except,	arguably,	between	Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc.	(USA	SC,	1984),	<http://
supreme.justia.com/us/464/417/case.html>,	464	United States Reports	417,	and	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.	(USA	SC,	2005),	<http://supreme.justia.com/us/545/04-480/case.html>,	125	
Supreme Court Reporter 2764.	Sony	was	interpreted	(wrongly	in	my	view)	as	deciding	that	private	uses	were	
fair	uses.	I	read	Sony	as	teaching	that	some	forms	of	time-shifting	copying	may	be	fair	use.	In	Grokster,	the	
US	Supreme	Court	went	back	to	traditional	fair	use	jurisprudence	and	focused	on	transformative—not	
purely	consumptive—uses.	
53.	 Birnhack,	“Global	Copyright,”	supra note	27;	Netanel,	Copyright’s Paradox,	supra	note	27.
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number	of	ways.54	But	copyright	must	now	face	other	rights.	It	is	not	or	no	longer	
viewed	as	a	closed	system	with	built-in	exceptions	such	as	fair	use	or	fair	dealing	
sufficient	to	ensure	the	right	balance	(at	least	not	completely).	To	mention	but	two	
examples,	 copyright	 enforcement	 vis-à-vis	 end-users	 (for	 example,	 to	 obtain	 a	
subscriber’s	identity	from	an	Internet	service	provider)	requires	a	normative	battle	
with	 the	 right	 to	privacy;55	 and	TpMs	 limiting	use	 and	enjoyment	of	 consumer	
goods	may	 involve	violation	of	consumer	protection	 legislation	 (for	example,	 if	
the	restriction	is	insufficiently	explained	at	the	time	of	sale).	
a	principled	approach	to	the	determination	of	limitations	and	exceptions	
must	factor	in	the	need	for	balance	against	the	backdrop	of	the	principles	and	
values	that	inform	the	intrinsic	public	interest	balance	of	copyright,	its	utilitarian/
economic	 function,	 and	 the	 recognition	of	 the	extrinsic	 factors	 that	 affect	 the	
realm	of	copyright.	
 2.2. Copyright in the Private Sphere
at	 the	 international	 level,	 but	 also	 in	 many	 national	 laws,	 limitations	 and	
exceptions	 appear	 as	 an	 incrementally	 developed	 patchwork	 of	 historical	
accretions,	a	patchwork	woven	reactively	or	in	response	to	poorly	defined	special	
interests	or	practical	constraints	(such	as	ephemeral	recording).	some	exceptions	
may	indeed	have	a	solid	normative	footing,	but	not	a	uniform	one.	private	use	
(which	will	be	discussed	separately	in	this	section)	provides	a	good	example	of	
this	 for	 many	 reasons:	 its	 multifaceted	 normative	 core	 (human	 right56	 and/or	
constitutional	rights,57	consumer	protection,	and	as	an	inherent	limit	to	the	reach	
of	 copyright),58	 its	 history	 in	 both	 anglo-saxon	 copyright	 and	 authors’	 rights	
traditions,	and	its	applicability	to	the	internet.	
54.	 Birnhack,	“Global	Copyright,”	supra note	27;	Netanel,	Copyright’s Paradox,	supra	note	27	and	
accompanying	text.
55.	 See	Pamela	Samuelson,	“Privacy	as	Intellectual	Property?,”	(2000)	52:5	Stanford Law Review	1125–1173,	
<http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers.html>	at	p.	1128:
	 While	utilitarian	considerations	weigh	heavily	in	the	minds	of	many	Americans	who	have	written	
on	 information	 privacy	 issues,	 noneconomic	 considerations	 provide	 an	 equally	 or	 more	
compelling	 rationale	 for	 legal	 protection	 for	 personal	 data	 in	 cyberspace,	 according	 to	 other	
commentators.	[For	t]hose	who	conceive	of	personal	data	protection	as	a	fundamental	civil	liberty	
interest,	 essential	 to	 individual	 autonomy,	 dignity,	 and	 freedom	 in	 a	 democratic	 civil	 society,	
information	privacy	legislation	is	often	viewed	as	necessary	to	ensure	protection	of	this	interest.
56.	 EC, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	(4	November	1950),	
<http://	conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>,	ETS	No.	155,	art.	8;	International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights	(16	December	1966),	UN,	General Assembly Resolution	2200A	(XXI),	<http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm>,	999	United Nations Treaty Series	187	(entry	into	force	23	March	
1976)	arts.	17	and	19.
57.	 For	example	in	the	United	States,	see	Julie	E	Cohen,	“A	Right	to	Read	Anonymously:	A	Closer	Look	at	
Copyright	Management	in	Cyberspace,”	(1996)	28:4	Connecticut Law Review	981–1039,	<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=17990>;	Julie	E.	Cohen,	“DRM	&	Privacy,”	(2003)	18:2	Berkeley Technology Law Journal 575–617,	
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=372741>.	In	“DRM	&	Privacy,”	Professor	Cohen	states	at	pp.	576–577:
	 Properly	 understood,	 an	 individual’s	 interest	 in	 intellectual	 privacy	 has	 both	 spatial	 and	
informational	aspects.	At	its	core,	this	interest	concerns	the	extent	of	“breathing	space,”	both	
metaphorical	 and	physical,	 available	 for	 intellectual	 activity.	DRM	 technologies	may	 threaten	
breathing	 space	 by	 collecting	 information	 about	 intellectual	 consumption	 (and	 therefore	
exploration)	or	by	imposing	direct	constraints	on	these	activities.
	 Furthermore,	she	argues	that	there	may	be	harm	in	allowing	individuals	to	waive	or	sell	usage	data	(via	a	
DRM	system)	if	it	amounts	to	waiving	their	intellectual	privacy,	“DRM	&	Privacy,”	at	p.	609.	
58.	 See	Alain	Strowel,	“Droit	d’auteur	et	accès	à	l’information:	de	quelques	malentendus	et	vrais	problèmes	à	
travers	l’histoire	et	les	développements	récents,”	(1999)	12:1	Les Cahiers de propriété intellectuelle	185–
208,	at	p.	198,	where	Professor	Strowel	considers	the	defence	of	the	private	sphere	as	one	of	the	three	main	
justifications	for	exceptions	to	copyright,	the	other	two	being	circulation	of	information,	and	cultural	and	
scientific	development.	
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To	make	matters	more	complex	still,	the	issue	has	taken	on	a	different	
hue	 on	 the	 internet.	 historically,	 copyright	 was	 a	 tool	 designed	 to	 support	
contractual	 relations	 between	 professionals	 (authors,	 publishers,	 producers,	
broadcasters,	etc.)	or	to	fight	professional	pirates.	It	has	now	become	a	tool	that	
rightsholders	use	against	end-users,	including	consumers.59	This	use	has	a	dual	
purpose:	 ensuring	 that	 end-users	 pay	 a	 fee	 for	 the	material	 they	 use	 (access	
through	 authorized	 sources),	 and	 preventing	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 material	 by	
those	 “end”-users	 to	 other	 users	 (in	 other	 words,	 preventing	 them	 from	
becoming	intermediaries).	
On	the	other	side	of	this	legal	and	technological	tug-of-war,	individual	
users	want	to	harness	the	enormous	capabilities	of	the	internet	to	access,	use,	
and	 disseminate	 information	 and	 content.	 The	 demand	 is	 large	 and	 ever	
increasing.60	 Internet	technology	has	responded	to	this	huge	pull	by	providing	
the	 initial	 adequate	 technological	 means.	 It	 has	 also	 responded	 to	 legal	 and	
technological	barriers	by	providing	new	tools:	 close	napster	and	peer-to-peer	
(p2p)61	 emerges.	 Try	 to	 shut	 p2p	 down,	 as	 was	 done	 in	 the	 recent	 wave	 of	
subpoenas	 and	 law	 suits	 against	 individual	 file	 traders	 and,	 quite	 predictably,	
anonymous	 file	 trading	 systems	 emerge,	 thus	defeating	 subpoenas	 served	on	
the	Isp	to	find	out	the	identity	of	subscribers.62			
The	fact	that	copyright’s	power	to	exclude	has	not,	historically,	extended	
its	 reach	 to	 individual	 end-users	was	 never	 formulated	with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
precision	 in	 copyright	 statutes	 and	 even	 less	 so	 in	 international	 treaties.	 It	 is,	
however,	a	fundamental	concept	of	many	national	copyright	systems,	including	
59.	 See	BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe,	2004	FC	488,	<http://reports.fja.gc.ca/en/2004/2004fc488/2004fc488.
html>,	2004:3	Federal Court Reports	241	(upheld	on	different	grounds	by	2005	FCA	193).
60.	 Richard	Stallman	wrote	a	perceptive	piece	in	1996:
	 The	Internet	is	relevant	because	it	facilitates	copying	and	sharing	of	writings	by	ordinary	readers.	
The	easier	it	is	to	copy	and	share,	the	more	useful	it	becomes,	and	the	more	copyright	as	it	stands	
now	becomes	a	bad	deal.
	 This	analysis	also	explains	why	it	makes	sense	for	the	Grateful	Dead	to	insist	on	copyright	for	CD	
manufacturing	but	not	for	individual	copying.	CD	production	works	like	the	printing	press;	it	is	not	
feasible	today	for	ordinary	people,	even	computer	owners,	to	copy	a	CD	into	another	CD.	Thus	
copyright	for	publishing	CDs	of	music	remains	painless	for	music	listeners,	 just	as	all	copyright	
was	painless	in	the	age	of	the	printing	press.	To	restrict	copying	�the	same	music	onto	a	digital	
audio	tape	does	hurt	the	listeners,	however,	and	they	are	entitled	to	reject	this	restriction.
	 We	can	also	see	why	 the	abstractness	of	 intellectual	property	 is	not	 the	crucial	 factor.	Other	
forms	 of	 abstract	 property	 represent	 shares	 of	 something.	 Copying	 any	 kind	 of	 share	 is	
intrinsically	a	zero-sum	activity;	the	person	who	copies	benefits	only	by	taking	wealth	away	from	
everyone	else.	Copying	a	dollar	bill	in	a	color	copier	is	effectively	equivalent	to	shaving	a	small	
fraction	 off	 of	 every	 other	 dollar	 and	 adding	 these	 fractions	 together	 to	 make	 one	 dollar.	
Naturally,	 we	 consider	 this	 wrong.	 By	 contrast,	 copying	 useful,	 enlightening	 or	 entertaining	
information	 for	 a	 friend	makes	 the	 world	 happier	 and	 better	 off;	 it	 benefits	 the	 friend	 and	
inherently	hurts	no	one.	It	is	a	constructive	activity	that	strengthens	social	bonds.
	 Richard	Stallman,	“Reevaluating	Copyright:	The	Public	Must	Prevail,”	(1996)	75:1	Oregon Law Review	291–
297,	<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/reevaluating-copyright.html>	at	p.	294.
61.	 A	type	of	network	in	which	any	computer	can	act	as	both	a	server	(by	providing	access	to	its	resources	to	
other	computers)	and	a	client	(by	accessing	shared	resources	from	other	computers).	
62.	 The	third	generation	of	P2P	software	has	anonymity	features	built	in.	Examples	include	ANts	P2P,	RShare,	
Freenet,	I2P,	GNUnet	and	Entropy.	Anonymity	tools	use	a	variety	of	routing	and	rerouting	techniques.	The	
user	computer	never	has	a	direct	link	with	the	host.	Instead,	the	information	is	relayed	over	several	
intermediate	clients	and	each	client	only	knows	the	IP	address	of	its	immediate	neighbors,	but	not	the	IP	of	
the	original	host.	See	<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Anonymous_P2P>.	This	obviously	makes	it	much	
harder	for	someone	to	identify	who	is	downloading	and	offering	files.	Combined	with	strong	encryption,	
traffic	“sniffing”	has	also	become	harder.	Everyone	loses	in	this	scenario	because	it	becomes	even	more	
difficult	to	know	what	is	happening	on	P2P	networks.	See	also	BMG Canada Inc. v John Doe,	supra	note	59	
and,	in	the	United	States,	Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v Verizon Internet Services	(USA	
DC	Cir,	2003),	<http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200312/03-7015a.pdf>,	257	Federal 
Supplement	2d	244.	
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Belgium63	and	Germany.	 In	Germany,	one	of	the	 leading	scholars	on	copyright	
and	patent	law,	Josef	Kohler,	argued	that	one	should	not	focus	on	the	technical	
nature	 of	 the	 use,	 but	 its	 impact	 and	 intent.64	 This	 affected	 several	 european	
national	systems.	In	the	words	of	professor	hugenholtz,	
[C]opyright	 protects	 against	 acts	 of	 unauthorized	 communication,	 not	
consumptive	usage	[…].	[T]he	mere	reception	or	consumption	of	information	
by	end-users	has	 traditionally	 remained	outside	 the	 scope	of	 the	copyright	
monopoly.	 arguably,	 the	 right	 of	 privacy	 and	 the	 freedom	 of	 reception	
guaranteed	in	articles	8	and	10	of	the	european	Convention	on	human	rights	
would	be	unduly	restricted	if	the	economic	right	encompassed	mere	acts	of	
information	reception	or	end	use.65	
This	strong	tradition	to	protect	the	private	sphere	of	uses	(i.e.	when	the	
use	is	truly	private	and	not	related	to	professional	or	commercial	activities)	might	
explain	why	Germany	was	the	 first	country	 to	 introduce	a	statutory	 license	 for	
private	copying	in	1965.66	however,	in	a	1955	case,	the	German	supreme	Court	
recognized	that	the	protection	of	the	private	sphere	was	not	absolute,	especially	
if	 the	 effects	 of	 what	 was	 happening	 inside	 the	 sphere	 had	 an	 impact	 on	
commercial	exploitation	outside	of	it.67		
This	crucial	role	of	private	use	is	also	illustrated	dialectically	in	the	swiss	
Copyright Act	of	1992,68	the	development	of	which	was	informed	doctrinally	by	
the	Germanic	approach	to	authors’	rights.	The	act	contains	a	very	broad	right	to	
prevent	use	of	a	copyrighted	work	in	article	10(1),	which	reads	as	follows:	“The	
author	shall	have	the	exclusive	right	to	decide	whether,	when	and	how	his	work	
is	 to	be	used.”69	however,	article	19	provides	 that	“[p]ublished	works	may	be	
used	for	private	purposes.”70
Canada’s	 private	 copying	 regime,	 like	Germany’s,	 is	 a	middle	 ground	
between	the	protection	of	the	private	sphere	of	users	and	the	rights	of	authors,	
especially	in	the	face	of	exponential	possibilities	to	make	private	digital	copies.71
63.	 See	Strowel,	“Droit	d’auteur	et	accès	à	l’information,”	supra	note	58.
64.	 Josef	Kohler,	Das Autorrecht: eine zivilistische Abhandlung; Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Eigenthum, 
vom Miteigenthum, vom Rechtsgeschäft und vom IndivIbidualrecht (Gustav		Fischer,	1880),	<http://dlib-pr.
mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/books/%22160676%22>	at	p.	230	[Josef	Kohler,	Author’s Right: A Civil 
Law Treatise. Which is also a contribution to the theory of property, joint property, legal transactions and 
individual rights	(Published	by	Gustav	Fischer,	1880)].
65.	 P	Bernt	Hugenholtz,	“Caching	and	Copyright:	The	Right	of	Temporary	Copying,”	(2000)	22:10	European Intellectual 
Property Review	482–493	at	pp.	482,	485–486.		Early	version	available	at	<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/
PBH-DIPPER.doc	>.	See	also	JH	Spoor,	Scripta manent	(Amsterdam,	1976),	at	pp.	137–138.	
66.	 See	Katerina	Gaita	and	Andrew	Christie,	“Principles	or	Compromise:	Understanding	the	Original	Thinking	
Behind	Statutory	License	and	Levy	Schemes	for	Private	Copying,”	2004:4	Intellectual Property Quarterly	
422–447,	<http://www.ipria.org/publications/workingpapers/IPRIA%20WP%2004.04.pdf>.	
67.	 GEMA v Grundig,	Bundesgerichtshof	[BGH]	(German	Federal	Supreme	Court,	18	May	1955),	1955	
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht	[GRUR]	492	(492)	(F.R.G).	
68.	 Switzerland,	Federal Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (Federal Copyright Law)	(9	October	1992),	
<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/ch/ch004en.html>,	(1993)	Recueil Officiel	1798	[English	translation	
by	WIPO].	
69.	 Switzerland,	Federal Copyright Law, supra note	68.	This	broad	“use	right”	is	explicated	using	traditional	
terminology	(reproduction,	communication,	etc.)	in	art.	19(2).	
70.	 Switzerland,	Federal Copyright Law, supra note	68.	The	exception	is	extended	to	copies	for	the	user	
manufactured	by	persons	other	than	the	user	and	libraries	that	make	copying	apparatus	available	to	their	
users.	However,	the	exception	does	not	apply	to	computer	programs	(arts.	19(2)	and	(3)).			
71.	 Andrew	Christie,	“Private	Copying	and	Levy	Schemes:	Resolving	the	Paradox	of	Civilian	and	Common	Law	
Approaches,”	in	David	Vaver	and	Lionel	Bently	eds.	Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays in 
Honour of William R. Cornish	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2004)	248–258,	<http://ssrn.com/
abstract=690521>.	
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against	 this	 backdrop,	 can	 the	 principle	 of	 “free”	 private	 use	 be	
exported	tel quel to	the	internet?	It	was	not	an	obvious	step	for	copyright	on	the	
internet	to	try	to	reach	end-users	who	do	not	consider	themselves	to	be	pirates	
and	who	do	not	act	with	the	intent	of	commercial	gain.	But	as	the	ninth	Circuit	
noted	in	Napster,72	accessing	a	commercial	copy	for	free,	even	if	for	use	in	the	
private	 sphere,	 may	 be	 analogized	 to	 a	 commercial	 use,	 if	 the	 copy	 should	
ordinarily	have	been	purchased.73	put	another	way,	 if	 the	main	purpose	of	 the	
private	use	is	to	avoid	“paying	the	customary	price,”74	then	the	nature	of	private	
use	has	indeed	changed.
In	fact,	this	is	exactly	what	has	changed:	private	use	may	now	be	seen	
as	a	means	of	access	to	a	commercial	product,	whereas	its	original	purpose	was	
to	allow	use	 in	private	and/or	 for	personal	purposes	after	access.	This	may	be	
where	the	conceptual	jump	requires	what	andré	Lucas	referred	to	as	the	need	
for	 a	 new	 balance,	 one	 that	 requires	 private	 use	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	
“private	access.”	75	at	the	level	of	principles,	use	of	a	copy	once	it	has	entered	
into	and	stays	in	the	private	sphere	is	one	thing,	and	there	are	good	normative	
reasons	why	it	should	remain	free,	 in	particular	copyright’s	balance	against	the	
right	of	privacy,	whether	as	a	constitutional	 right	on	 the	national	 level	or	as	a	
principle	of	international	human	rights	law.	But	private	use	applied	to	access	to	
copies	 designed	 to	 circumvent	 commercial	 distribution	 channels	 is	 a	 different	
issue.	There	may	be	other	reasons	not	to	sue	individual	consumers,	and	the	fact	
that	the	p2p	phenomenon	has	thus	far	proven	impossible	to	stop,	and	that	there	
are	good	reasons	to	think	it	will	continue	that	way,	may	well	be	a	reason	to	shift	
the	thinking	towards	the	establishment	of	a	liability	regime.76	however,	this	type	
of	access	is	not	“private	use,”	as	the	term	has	been	used	historically.
as	 professor	 paul	 Goldstein	 has	 noted,	 the	 fact	 that	 “performances	 of	
literary	 and	 artistic	 works	 migrate	 from	 public	 places—in	 which	 authors	 are	
compensated—to	private	places—in	which	they	are	not—[and	hence]	the	failure	
to	 compensate	 for	 private	 use	 can	 seriously	 undermine	 the	 economics	 of	
authorship.”77	If	that	is	the	case,	it	may	well	be	that	the	changes	brought	about	
by	the	internet	require,	once	the	three-step	test	is	factored	into	the	equation,	the	
establishment	of	a	compensation	mechanism.	however,	at	the	level	of	principles,	
the	private	use	sphere	should	remain	free	of	the	reach	of	the	exclusive	right	to	
prohibit.	This	would	be	subject	to	TpMs,	but	the	imposition	of	an	obligation	to	
remove	TpMs	in	order	to	empower	the	private	use	is	a	valid	policy	consideration,	
and	the	principles	proposed	below	include	a	provision	to	that	effect,	subject	to	
a	proportionality	test.
 
72.	 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc.,	(USA	9th	Cir,	2001),	<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/89AE13
D39D4D4BAA88256B8700619C17/$file/0115998.pdf?openelement>,		239	Federal Reporter 3d	1004	[Napster].	
73.	 See	Napster, supra note	72	and	Jane	C	Ginsburg,	“Copyright	Use	and	Excuse	on	the	Internet,”	(2000)	24	
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts	1–45	<	http://ssrn.com/abstract=239747>.
74.	 See	Harper & Row, Inc. v Nation	Enterprises	(USA	Sup	Ct,	1985),	<http://supreme.justia.com/us/471/539/
case.html>,	471	US	539,	562.
75.	 André	Lucas,	“Summary	of	the	Proceedings	of	the	Symposium,”	in	WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Future 
of Copyright and Neighboring Rights,	WIPO	Publication	No.	731	(Geneva:	WIPO,	1994),	at	pp.	276–277.	
76.	 See	Gervais,	“The	Price	of	Social	Norms,” supra	note	30.
77.	 Paul	Goldstein,	“Copyright	and	Authors’	Rights	in	the	Twenty-First	Century,”	in	WIPO Worldwide 
Symposium on the Future of Copyright and Neighboring Rights,	supra note	75	at	p.	264.
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2.3. Towards Principles for Limitations and Exceptions
What	 the	 above	 analysis	 suggests	 is	 that	 a	 proper	 design	 of	 limitations	 and	
exceptions	must	be	better	 conceptualized	and	 informed	both	by	 the	need	 to	
maintain	 the	 intrinsic	 balance	 of	 copyright—a	 balance	 that	 may	 have	 been	
overlooked,	 at	 least	 normatively,	 in	 some	 of	 the	 revisions	 of	 the	 Berne 
Convention—and	by	the	need	to	ensure	copyright’s	compatibility	with	external	
norms,	 such	 as	 privacy,	 the	 right	 to	 free	 expression,	 information,	 culture,	
education	and	the	more	controversial	right	to	development.78	It	is	not	possible	
to	examine	each	of	these	rights	in	detail,	but	as	the	purpose	of	this	article	is	to	
contribute	 to	 the	development	of	a	principled	conceptualization	 for	copyright	
limitations	and	exceptions	at	the	international	level,	it	will	be	assumed	that	these	
norms	form	part	of	the	international	 legal	order.	as	the	appellate	Body	of	the	
World	Trade	Organization	recognizes,	these	rights	are	indeed	directly	relevant	in	
interpreting	WTO	agreements,	including	the	TrIps	agreement.79	
2.3.1.	a	Conceptualization	of	Limitations	and	exceptions
any	conceptualization	must	recognize	that	limitations	and	exceptions	fulfill	multiple	
purposes	and	functions.	as	a	result,	they	are	expressed	in	a	variety	of	ways,	which	
makes	comparison	and	understanding	more	challenging.	I	suggest,	however,	that	
they	 can	 be	 organized	 according	 to	 the	 following	 categorization:	 whether	 they	
apply	to	some	categories	of	users;	whether	they	apply	to	some	categories	of	use;	
whether	they	apply	to	some	categories	of	countries;	whether	they	apply	to	some	
categories	of	authors;	and	finally,	whether	they	apply	to	some	categories	of	works.	
a	tabular	illustration	illuminates	this	approach	more	clearly.
78.	 Ruth	Okediji,	“The	Limits	of	Development	Strategies	at	the	Intersection	of	Intellectual	Property	and	Human	
Rights,”	in	Daniel	Gervais,	ed.,	Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize 
Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era	(Oxford	University	Press,	2007)	355–384;	and	Robert	J	Gutowski,	
“The	Marriage	of	Intellectual	Property	and	International	Trade	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement:	Strange	Bedfellows	
or	a	Match	Made	in	Heaven?”	(1999)	47	Buffalo Law Review	713–761	at	pp.	713,	715.		
79.	 The	WTO	Appellate	Body	found	that	the	WTO	Agreement	“is	not	to	be	read	in	clinical	isolation	from	public	
international	law.”	United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,	(19	April	1996)	
WTO	Doc.	WT/DS2/AB/R	(Appellate	Body	Report),	<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?q
u=&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F2ABR%2EWPF%2EHTM>	at	para.	3,	part	B.	
This	principle	was	reflected	in	this	and	subsequent	decisions,	which	however	relied,	at	a	very	general	level	
only,	on	the	case	law	of	other	international	tribunals,	namely	the	International	Court	of	Justice,	the	European	
Court	of	Human	Rights	cases	and	the	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights,	to	interpret	the	provisions	of	the	
WTO	Agreement.	See	Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,	(4	October	1996)	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS8/AB/R	
(Appellate	Body	Report),	<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=&doc=D%3A%2FDDFD
OCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F8ABR%2EWPF%2EHTM>	at	part	D,	footnote	19.
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Table	2.	possible	principles	for	a	Conceptualization	of	Limitations	and	exceptions
CaTeGOrIzaTIOn	 CaTeGOrIes	 InTernaL	BaLanCe	 exTernaL	nOrMs	
By type of user	 Limited	ability	users	 Braille	copies	 non-discrimination
	 Consumers	 private	sphere/	 privacy,	consumer
	 	 difficult	enforcement	 protection
	 Government	 	 education,	culture,
	 	 	 information	(national
	 	 	 security)
	 Institutional80	 	 education,	culture,
	 	 	 information
	 all	 reuse	by	quotation	 Information,	free	expression
By type of use	 Consumptive	 private	sphere/	 privacy,	consumer
	 	 difficult	enforcement	 protection,	education,
	 	 	 information,	culture
	 Creative/transformative	 Limit	right	to	prohibit	 free	expression,	culture,
	 	 when	beyond	need;	 information
	 	 public	interest	balance
	 Informational	 public	interest	balance		 Information,	free	expression
By type of country	 Developing	country	 	 right	to	development;	
	 	 	 education
	 	
By type of author	 Governmental	works	 no	incentive	needed	 Information
By type of work	 Computer	software	 public	interest	function	 Competition
	 	 does	not	require	prohibition
	 	 of	reverse	engineering81
	 printed	publications	 access	does	not	interfere	 education,	information
	 	 with	copyright’s	function
It	 should	also	be	pointed	out	at	 this	 juncture	 that	 international	norms	
concerning	limitations	and	exceptions	can	be	categorized	by	their	legal nature.	
some	are	mandatory	(for	example,	the	quotation	right	in	the	Berne Convention);	
others	 are	 declaratory	 in	 nature	 and	 designed	 to	 signal	 the	 compatibility	 of	
certain	 limitations	 and	 exceptions	 with	 the	 international	 legal	 order.	 This,	
however,	is	not	directly	relevant	in	examining	the	underlying	principles,	though	
it	becomes	relevant	when	implementing	the	principle.	
Before	proceeding	from	the	above	conceptualization	systematically,	the	
reader	no	doubt	has	noticed	that	the	categorization	not	found	above	is	by	type 
of right.	Downstream,	such	a	categorization	would	be	useless	because	(a)	many	
uses	 do	 not	 involve	 a	 single	 right,	 but	 rather	 several	 (for	 example,	 uploading	
material	to	the	internet	may	involve	the	right	of	reproduction,	the	right	of	public	
performance/communication,	 the	 right	 of	 display,	 where	 applicable,	 and	 the	
right	of	adaptation);82	(b)	now	that	copyright	is	increasingly	applied	to	end-users,	
it	has	become	even	more	illusory	to	expect	that	individual	consumers	can	parse	
which	right	or	sub-right	fragment	they	may	need.	Upstream,	I	suggest	that	it	is	
an	 unprincipled	 approach	 to	make	 an	 exception	 dependent	 on	 the	 technical	
nature	of	the	right.	put	differently,	as	a	matter	of	principle	the	legislator	should	
not	 grant	 a	 limitation	 or	 exception	 because	 it	 is,	 for	 example,	 the	 right	 of	
reproduction	that	is	involved	rather	than	the	right	of	adaptation,	but	should	do	
80.	 For	example,	libraries,	museums,	archives	and	educational	institutions.
81.	 See	Pam	Samuelson	and	Suzanne	Scotchmer,	“The	Law	&	Economics	of	Reverse	Engineering”	(2002)	111	
The Yale Law Journal	1575–1663,	<http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/200.pdf>.
82.	 Even	if	only	one	right	is	involved	(e.g.	reproduction),	that	right	itself	may	have	been	fragmented	
contractually	by,	for	example,	the	type	of	market,	user,	language,	or	country.
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so	 because	 of	 the	 underlying	 public	 interest	 (both	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 internal	
copyright	balance	and	to	 reflect	external	normative	 forces	and	the	search	 for	
new	equilibria).	This	means	that	limitations	and	exceptions	should	be	expressed	
in	terms	that	are	independent of the technical nature	of	the	use	(reproduction,	
communication,	 performance,	 etc.)	 unless	 this	 is	 contextually	 required.	 for	
instance,	use	in	the	private	sphere	(whether	expressed	as	private	performance,	
private	copying,	or	teleologically	as,	say,	private	study)	should	not	be	subject	to	
exclusive	copyright	rights.		
This	approach	is	fully	supported	by	the	three-step	test,	which	is	the	filter	
through	 which	 limitations	 and	 exceptions	 must	 pass	 to	 be	 or	 remain	 TrIps-
compatible.	 The	 test,	 as	we	will	 see	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 is	 effects-based	 and	
independent	 of	 the	 technical	 mode	 of	 use	 (i.e.,	 not	 linked	 to	 the	 rights	
fragment(s)	that	may	be	affected	by	the	limitation	or	exception).
2.3.2.	proposed	principles
as	I	have	just	argued,	limitations	and	exceptions	should	be	expressed	in	terms	of	
their	effects	in	order	to	allow	policy	makers	to	align	limitations	and	exceptions	with	
underlying	objectives.	however,	 because	 rights	 are	 still	 dominantly	 expressed	 in	
terms	 of	 technical	 acts	 such	 as	 reproduction,	 performance,	 or	 communication	
(though	 contracts	 rarely	 do:	 a	 right	 to	 use	 a	 film	 for	 broadcasting	 is	 probably	
unlikely	 to	 specify	 how	many	 acts	 of	 reproduction,	 communication,	 etc.,	 can	be	
done;	it	will	authorize	the	“broadcasting”	of	a	work	for	a	period	of	time	and	in	or	
to	a	specific	market),	it	may	still	be	necessary	when	drafting	national	laws	to	express	
them	in	such	terms.	even	then,	a	paradigmatic	shift	in	the	expression	of	limitations	
and	exceptions	(a)	may	be	better	to	achieve	the	policy	alignment;	and	(b)	would	
provide	courts	with	an	enhanced	toolbox	to	ensure	proper	application	in	each	case.
It	is	not	possible	in	this	paper	to	provide	a	complete	set	of	exceptions,	
but	 international	 rules	 should	 allow	 exceptions	 and	 limitations	 in	 the	 cases	
identified	 in	 Table	 2.	 The	 underlying	 principles,	 if	 they	 can	 be	 grouped	 at	 a	
higher	level	of	abstraction,	probably	would	look	like	this:
a)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prohibit	use	in	the	private	sphere	of	users;83
b)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prohibit	access	in	countries	or	to	groups	of	
users	who	have	otherwise	no	reasonable	means	of	access	to	copyright	
content;84
c)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prevent	educational	uses	that	cannot	be	
reasonably	licensed;85	
83.	 If	a	need	for	enforcement	arises,	it	will	be	because	the	user	has	stepped	out	of	her	private	sphere	and	her	
actions	have	reached	a	level	where	a	commercial	impact	is	perceptible.		From	an	effects-based	perspective,	
it	should	not	matter	which	type	of	content	is	used	or	whether	the	issue	is	space,	time,	or	format-shifting,	if	
there	is	no	significant	market	in	selling	(“selling”	is	used	here	generically,	and	not	to	refer	to	copying,	
performing,	etc.)	additional	copies	when	compared	to	the	burden	on	the	consumer.	
84.	 This	would	include	educators	in	less	economically	developed	areas.
85.	 From	an	effects-based	perspective,	it	should	not	much	matter	whether	the	teaching	is	done	“on	the	premises”	or	
at	a	distance.	As	a	public	interest	matter,	it	may,	however,	matter	whether	or	not	the	teaching	is	done	for	profit.	
“Reasonably	licensed”	in	this	context	refers	to	the	availability	of	a	transaction	at	a	price	and	with	conditions	
including	transaction	costs	that	one	would	consider	ordinary	in	light	of	market	practices.	The	concept	of	“accepted	
market	practices”	in	competition	(antitrust)	law	might	be	a	useful	reference.	
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d)		Copyright	rights	should	not	prohibit	access	by	institutions	whose	
purpose	is	to	document	and	preserve	cultural	assets;86
e)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prevent	uses	and	reuses	that	serve	the	
public	interest	in	free	expression,	including	the	creation	and	
dissemination	of	culture	and	information.	This	includes	quotation,	
parody,	and	other	similar	“transformative”	uses.87	It	also	includes	
research,88	and	criticism	and	review	(subject	to	(i)	below);	
f)		 Courts	should	have	the	latitude	not	to	apply	exclusive	rights	when	they	
interfere	unreasonably	with	the	right	of	information	or	the	rights	of	a	
free	press;89	
g)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prevent	governmental	use	in	the	public	
interest	(though	generally	with	compensation).	Internal	and	commercial	
uses	by	the	government	would,	however,	remain	subject	to	exclusive	
rights;
h)		 Copyright	rights	should	not	prevent	access	and	(at	least	non-commercial)	
use	of	governmental	publications	of	a	general	nature;90	
i)		 all	limitations	and	exceptions,	except	arguably	with	respect	to	(e)	above,	
may	be	limited	to	uses	that	will	not	demonstrably	affect	the	normal	
commercial	exploitation	and	to	non-commercial	uses;	
j)		 In	cases	where	the	public	interest	justifies	the	exception	but	it	will	cause	
a	loss	of	income,	a	compensation	mechanism	should	be	in	place.
In	terms	of	enforcement	and	procedure,	most	exceptions	do	not	require	
specific	 mechanisms,	 and	 no	 new	 international	 norms	 seem	 necessary	 in	 this	
area.	Users	usually	invoke	limitations	and	exceptions	as	defenses	to	infringement	
actions.	Where	available,	declaratory	 rulings	may	also	be	used.	Logically,	uses	
covered	by	an	exception	should	not	be	“circumvented”	by	TpMs.	This	requires	
a	governmental	mechanism	(courts	or	a	specialized	agency	or	tribunal91)	to	order	
that	a	TpM	be	removed	in	whole	or	in	part	in	cases	where	the	use	permitted	by	
the	 exception	 or	 limitation	 is	 not	 possible.	 The	 competent	 authority	 should,	
however,	 be	 allowed	 to	 refuse	 the	 remedy	 and	 perhaps	 offer	 compensation	
instead	(for	example,	in	cases	where	unlocking	the	TpM	is	liable	to	cause	harm	
86.	 Based	on	the	three-step	test,	the	focus	should	not	be	on	considerations	such	as	whether	one	or	two	copies	
are	made,	in	which	format,	and	whether	they	are	permanent	or	not,	but	rather	on	modes	of	public	access	to	
those	copies	that	may	interfere	with	normal	commercial	exploitation.	
87.	 In	the	wording	of	the	initial	versions	of	the	Berne Convention,	namely	works	that	“present the character of a 
new original work.” This	is	a	good	start	for	an	international	definition	of	what	is	a	“transformative”	(as	opposed	
to	a	mere	derivative)	work.	However,	“transformative”	should	probably	be	measured	using	a	more	complex	test	
of	societal	value	and	the	impact	of	the	commercial	exploitation	on	the	work	from	which	it	is	derived.	
88.	 As	a	result	of	the	application	of	the	three-step	test,	“research”	could	include	some	communication	among	a	
research	team	but	not	public	dissemination	of	results	using	copyrighted	material	belonging	to	third	parties.		
89.	 This	right,	perhaps	the	most	foundational	of	democratic	systems	and	the	most	potentially	transformative	in	
fledgling	democracies,	should	be	of	paramount	importance,	though	the	commercial	nature	of	the	media	
should	not	be	completely	ignored.	This	equilibrium	is	reflected	by	the	use	of	the	term	“reasonably”	and	the	
inherent	content	of	the	right	of	information.
90.	 “Of	a	general	nature”	in	this	context	means	publications	not	specifically	destined	for	a	market	constituted	
mainly	by	users	who	benefit	from	the	exception.	
91.	 For	example,	the	“Autorité	de	régulation	des	mesures	techniques,” established	under	art.	L.	331-17	of	the	
French Intellectual Property Code,	as	amended	by	the	Loi n° 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au	droit 
d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information,	(3	August	2006)	no.	178	Journal	officiel	de	la	
République	Française	p.	11529.	<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000026
6350&dateTexte=>.		
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to	 the	 rightsholder	 and	 this	 harm	outweighs	 the	user’s	 interest	 in	 unlocking	a	
particular	 work	 for	 a	 given	 purpose).	 however,	 enforcement	 is	 also	 linked	 to	
statutory	damages.	The	application	of	this	type	of	damages,	while	it	is	necessary	
in	commercial	piracy	cases	to	ensure	deterrence,	should	not	interfere	with	bona 
fide	recourse	to	exceptions	developed	under	the	above	set	of	principles.
some	limitations	and	exceptions	in	national	and	regional	legislation	are	
worded	 in	 terms	 that	 mirror	 some	 of	 the	 above	 principles	 fairly	 closely	 (for	
example,	 private	 use).	 Clearly,	 however,	 a	 number	 of	 existing	 limitations	 and	
exceptions	may	 serve	multiple	purposes.	for	example,	 reverse	engineering	of	
computer	programs	is	necessary	to	allow	research	and	to	perform	certain	private	
uses.	This	 follows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	exceptions	are	expressed	 in	 terms	of	 the	
technical	 act	 (for	 example,	 decompilation/reverse	 engineering)	 and	 not	 their	
purpose.	such	exceptions	need	not	be	changed,	though	their	interpretation	and	
application	 in	a	particular	case	should	be	 informed	by	the	underlying	purpose	
they	are	designed	to	achieve.	
*
3. ThE ThrEE-sTEP TEsT
3.1. Historical Background
at the 1967 stockholm berne convention revision conference,	 a	 general	 rule	
known	 as	 the	 “three-step	 test”	 was	 added	 to	 the	Berne Convention	 to	 limit	
exceptions	 to	 the	 right	 of	 reproduction—a	 right	 which	 was	 added	 to	 the	
Convention	at	the	same	revision	Conference.	according	to	the	study	Group	set	
up	by	BIrpI92	 (the	predecessor	of	the	World	 Intellectual	property	Organization	
(WIpO))	93	and	the	swedish	government	to	prepare	the	Conference,	because	the	
right	 of	 reproduction	 was	 added	 to	 the	 Convention,	 a	 “satisfactory	 formula	
would	have	to	be	found	for	the	inevitable	exceptions	to	that	right.”94		The	Group	
noted	that,
while	 it	was	obvious	 that	all	 forms	of	exploiting	a	work	which	had,	or	were	
likely	 to	 acquire,	 considerable	 economic	 or	 practical	 importance	 must	 in	
principle	 be	 reserved	 to	 the	 authors	 […]	 it	 should	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that	
domestic	 laws	already	contained	a	series	of	exceptions	 in	 favour	of	various	
public	 and	 cultural	 interests	 and	 […]	 it	 would	 be	 vain	 to	 suppose	 that	
countries	would	 be	 ready	 at	 this	 stage	 to	 abolish	 these	 exceptions	 to	 any	
appreciable	extent.95		
The	 Group	 also	 recommended	 that	 exceptions	 should	 be	 “made	 for	
clearly	 specified	 purposes”96	 and,	 using	 language	 that	 is	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 the	
92.	 Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle (United	International	Bureaux	
for	the	Protection	of	Intellectual		Property).
93.	 See	<www.wipo.int>.
94.	 Quoted	in	Mihály	Ficsor,	The Law of Copyright and the Internet	(Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	at	s.	5.51.
95.	 Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967 (Geneva:	WIPO, 
1971),	at	p.	111[Records of the Stockholm Conference].	
96. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note	95	at	p.	112.	
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traditional	Us	fair	use	jurisprudence	(discussed	below),	added	that	a	limitation	on	
the	exclusive	right	of	the	author	“should	not	enter	 into	economic	competition	
with”	 protected	 works.97	 These	 considerations	 would	 inform	 the	 work	 of	 the	
Conference	and	the	interpretation	of	the	test.
The	work	of	the	study	Group	was	handed	over	at	the	Conference	to	a	
Working	Group	whose	mandate	was	to	try	to	operationalize	the	findings	of	the	
study	Group	 in	the	text	of	 the	Convention.	at	the	outset,	 the	Working	Group	
proposed	a	text	that	would	have	allowed	exceptions	(a)	for	private	use;	(b)	for	
judicial	or	administrative	purposes;	and	(c)	“in	certain	particular	cases	where	the	
reproduction	is	not	contrary	to	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	author	and	does	
not	 conflict	 with	 a	 normal	 exploitation	 of	 the	 work.”98	 The	 debates	 at	 the	
Conference	 initially	 focused	 on	 the	merits	 of	 adding	 a	 list	 of	 well	 delineated	
exceptions	(which	included	(a)	and	(b),	but	not	(c),	above).	Instead,	because	the	
outcome	of	the	debate	was	taking	the	form	of	a	shopping	list,	the	Conference	
opted	to	follow	a	British	proposal	to	take	out	(a)	and	(b)	entirely	and	to	replace	
them	with	a	general	provision	along	the	lines	of	(c).99	
The	 Conference	 also	 provided	 guidance	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
test,	and	indicated	that	the	first	logical	step	(the	Conference	did	not	consider	the	
“special	case”	requirement	to	be	a	separate	step,	a	view	with	which	I	agree	and	
to	which	I	will	return	below)	was	to	determine	whether	there	was	a	conflict	with	
normal	commercial	exploitation.	If	not,	then	either	a	compulsory	license	or	a	full	
exception	 could	 be	 introduced	 in	 national	 law.	 The	 compulsory	 license	 (with	
remuneration)	would	then	counterbalance	the	level	of	prejudice	in	the	last	step,	
i.e.	it	would	render	such	prejudice	reasonable	where	this	was	necessary.100	
	The	test	adopted	at	the	1967	Convention	was	thus	intended	to	guide	
national	 legislators	 as	 to	 the	 proper	 scope	 of	 exceptions	 to the right of 
reproduction.101		
3.2. Interpretation
The	test	contained	in	article	9(2)	of	the	Berne Convention	allows	exceptions	to	
the	right	of	reproduction
•	 in	certain	special	cases;
•	 that	do	not	conflict	with	the	normal	commercial	exploitation	of	the	work;	and
•	 do	not	unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	author.
The	test	was	relatively	obscure	until	1994.	That	year,	with	the	adoption	
97. Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note	95.
98.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note	95	at	p.	113.
99.	 Ficsor,	The Law of Copyright and the Internet,	supra note	94	at	s.	5.53.
100.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference,	supra	note	95	at	para.	85	of	the	Report	of	Main	Committee	I.
101.	 See	Daniel	Gervais,	The TRIPs	Agreement: Drafting History And Analysis,	2d	ed.	(Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2003),	at	
pp.	144–147;	Mihály	Ficsor,	“How	Much	of	What?	The	Three-Step	Test	and	its	Application	in	Two	Recent	WTO	
Dispute	Settlement	Cases,”	(2002)	192	Revue internationale du droit d’auteur	111–251,	at	pp.	231–242.		
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of	 the	 WTO	 TrIps	 agreement,102	 it	 became	 the	 cornerstone	 for	 almost	 all	
exceptions	to	all	intellectual	property	rights	in	international	law.	It	is	now	used	as	
the	model	for	exceptions	to	all copyright rights	in	TrIps	(article	13),	to	the	rights	
created	by	the	WIPO Copyright Treaty103	(article	10),	and	the	WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty	(article	16).	Interestingly,	in	TrIps,	it	is	also	the	basis	for	
exceptions	to	industrial	design	protection	(article	26(2)),	and	patent	rights	(article	
30).	There	is,	however,	a	crucial	difference	in	the	case	of	patent	rights,	which	may	
impact	how	the	rule	is	interpreted	when	applied	to	copyright:	the	last	(third)	step	
of	the	test	in	article	30	requires	that	exceptions	not	unreasonably	prejudice	the	
legitimate	interests	of	the	patent	owner,	“taking account of the legitimate interests 
of third parties.”104 
3.2.1.	“Certain	special	Cases”	
There	 are	 two	ways	 to	 interpret	 this	 first	 step.	 The	 first	 finds	 its	 origin	 in	 the	
history	of	the	Berne Convention.	In	the	first	edition	of	his	seminal	book	on	the	
Berne Convention,105	professor	sam	ricketson	opined	that	“special”	meant	that	
the	 exception	 must	 have	 a	 purpose	 and	 be	 justified	 by	 public	 policy.106	 This	
purpose-oriented	(or	“teleological”)	interpretation	of	the	Convention	is	seemingly	
reinforced	by	the	use	of	the	phrase	“to	the	extent	justified	by	the	purpose”	in	
articles	10(1)	and	10(2)	of	the	Convention	(which	allow	exceptions	to	be	made	
for	 quotation	 and	 teaching),	 and	 article	 10bis(2)	 (which	 allows	 reporting	 of	
current	events).107	public	 information	(or	the	public’s	right	to	know)108	 is	clearly	
the	 policy	 basis	 for	 the	 latter	 exception	 and	 for	 the	 possible	 exclusion	 from	
copyright	of	certain	official	texts.		
The	 2000	 WTO	 panel	 decision	 concerning	 section	 110(5)	 of	 the	 Us	
Copyright Act109	adopted	a	different	approach	to	interpret	the	first	part	of	the	
three-step	test,	namely	the	meaning	of	“special.”	This	was	the	first	time	it	was	
interpreted	 by	 an	 international	 tribunal.	 The	 panel	 was	 aware	 of	 ricketson’s	
102.	 TRIPS	Agreement,	supra note	5.	The	TRIPS	Agreement	also	contains	a	list	of	material	excluded	for	
copyrightability	(art.	9(2)),	namely	“ideas,	procedures,	methods	of	operation	or	mathematical	concepts	as	
such.”		Article	13	also	extends	the	three-step	test	of	the	Berne Convention	to	cover	any	copyright	right	
(including,	e.g.	public	performance).		
103.	 This	treaty	was	implemented	in	the	United	States	by	the	Digital Millennium Copyright Act,	Pub.	L.	no.	105–
304,	112	Statutes at Large	2860,	s.	10	and	preamble,	<http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf>.		The	
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 is	title	I	of	the	
DMCA.	The	treaty	has	at	least	two	interesting	features	for	our	purposes,	namely	the	application	of	the	
three-step	test	in	its	art.	10	and	the	following	declaration	in	its	Preamble:	“Recognizing	the	need	to	
maintain	a	balance	between	the	rights	of	authors	and	the	larger	public	interest,	particularly	education,	
research	and	access	to	information,	as	reflected	in	the	Berne Convention.”
104.	 TRIPS	Agreement,	supra note	5,	art.	30	(emphasis	added).	I	am	indebted	to	Dr.	Mihály	Ficsor,	who	shared	
his	views	on	the	WTO	panel	decision	dealing	with	s.	110(5)	of	the	US	Copyright Act, infra note	109).
105.	 Sam	Ricketson,	The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886-1986	(Sweet	&	
Maxwell,	1987).	
106.	 Ricketson, The Berne Convention,	supra note	105	at	p.	482.		A	different	approach	is	presented	in	the	new	
edition	of	his	commentary,	coauthored	with	Professor	Ginsburg.	See	Sam	Ricketson	and	Jane	C.	Ginsburg,	
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond	(Oxford	University	
Press,	2006),	vol.	1,	at	ss.	13.10–13.12.
107.	 Berne Convention, supra note	4	at	art.	10.
108.	 As	embodied	in	part	in	s.	2(b)	of	the	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,	<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
en/charter/>.	
109.	 United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,	(15	June	2000)	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS160/R	(WTO	
Dispute	Settlement	Panel	Report),	<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.pdf>	[United 
States—Section 110(5) Panel Report].
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view110	but	opted	to	look	at	the	Oxford Dictionary:111
The	term	“special”	connotes	“having	an	 individual	or	 limited	application	or	
purpose”,	 “containing	 details;	 precise,	 specific”,	 “exceptional	 in	 quality	 or	
degree;	unusual;	out	of	the	ordinary”	or	“distinctive	in	some	way”.	This	term	
means	 that	 more	 is	 needed	 than	 a	 clear	 definition	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 the	
standard	of	the	first	condition.		In	addition,	an	exception	or	limitation	must	be	
limited	in	its	field	of	application	or	exceptional	in	its	scope.		In	other	words,	
an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a 
qualitative sense.112
The	 approach	 chosen	 by	 the	 panel	 is	 understandable.	 for	 valid	
normative	reasons,113	 in	previous	decisions	the	WTO	appellate	Body	preferred	
to	 adhere	 to	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 words,	 notably	 to	 avoid	 introducing	
“unbargained	for”	concessions	in	the	WTO	legal	framework.114	This	approach	is	
arguably	compatible	with	the	stockholm	study	Group,	which	had	requested	that	
any	exception	to	the	right	of	reproduction	be	“for	clearly	specified	purposes.”
The	“dictionary	approach”	has	been	criticized	as	a	 form	of	 textualism	
rather	 than	contextualism,	 that	 is,	an	 incomplete	and	result-oriented	approach	
and	not	necessarily	the	best	way	to	identify	the	“ordinary	meaning.”115	however,	
it	 seems	 that,	 with	 the	 WTO	 as	 arbiter	 of	 international	 intellectual	 property	
disputes	concerning	both	the	TrIps	agreement	and	the	Berne Convention	 (as	
incorporated	into	TrIps),	the	“dictionary	approach,”	which	sees	the	first	step	as	
requiring	some	clear	definition	of	the	contours	of	an	exception,	is	here	to	stay.	
That	being	said,	the	other	view,	namely	that	there	is	(also)	a	normative	element	
to	the	first	step	and	that	it	requires	the	demonstration	of	the	existence	of	a	valid	
public	 policy,	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 analysis	 of	 both	 panels,	 especially	 the	
Canada Pharmaceuticals	panel	report.116	
		It		is	worth	noting	also	that,	at	the	1967	stockholm	Conference,	this	first	
step	was	really	a	last	filter:
If	it	is	considered	that	reproduction117	conflicts	with	the	normal	exploitation	of	
the	 work,	 reproduction	 is	 not	 permitted	 at	 all.	 If	 it	 is	 considered	 that	
110.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note	109	at	note	114.	
111.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note	109	at	paras.	6.108–6.110.
112.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note	109	at	para.	6.109	(emphasis	added;	omitting	
footnote	in	the	original	to	the	Oxford Dictionary).
113.	 Essentially,	that	trade	agreements	are	bargained	for	and	should	not,	therefore,	be	“completed”	or	
amended	by	interpretation.	See e.g., United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline,	supra note	79,	in	which	the	Appellate	Body	stated	that	“applying	the	basic	principle	of	
interpretation	that	the	words	of	a	treaty,	like	the	General Agreement,	are	to	be	given	their	ordinary	meaning,	
in	their	context	and	in	the	light	of	the	treaty’s	object	and	purpose.”
114.	 Gervais,	The TRIPS Agreement, supra note	101,	at	p.	146.
115.	 Dongsheng	Zang,	“Textualism	In	GATT/WTO	Jurisprudence:	Lessons	For	The	Constitutionalization	
Debate,”	(2006)	33	Syracuse Journal of International Law & Commerce	393–444,	at	pp.	428-434.
116.	 In	a	second	panel	report	dealing	with	article	30	(another	instantiation	of	the	test)	dealing	with	limitations	
contained	in	the	Canadian	Patent Act,	the	first	step	was	interpreted	as	meaning	“limited”	(such	as,	for	
patents,	limited	to	an	area	of	technology).	Those	interpretations	are	more	likely	to	guide	future	WTO	panels	
called	upon	to	apply	the	three-step	test.	See Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products	case,	
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf>,	(2000)	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS114/R.	An	exception	
must	thus	be	limited	to	a	reasonably	narrow	use	or	category	of	users.
117.	 This	quote	relates	to	the	three-step	test	contained	in	art.	9(2)	of	the	Berne Convention,	where	it	only	applies	
to	the	right	of	reproduction.	In	art.	13	of	TRIPS,	it	was	extended	to	all	copyright	rights.
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reproduction	does	not	conflict	with	the	normal	exploitation	of	the	work,	the	
next	step	would	be	to	consider	whether	it	does	not	unreasonably	prejudice	
the	legitimate	interests	of	the	author.	Only	if	such	is	not	the	case	would	it	be		
possible	 in	 certain	 special	 cases	 to	 introduce	 a	 compulsory	 license,	 or	 to	
provide	for	use	without	payment.118
In	sum,	most	purpose-specific,	 limited	exceptions	should	pass	the	first	
step	of	the	test.	One	could	argue	that	an	exception	limited	to	a	class	of	users	is	
similarly	limited	in	scope.	It	is	less	clear,	however,	that	an	open-ended	“fair	use”	
provision	would	necessarily	meet	this	part	of	the	test.
3.2.2.			Interference	with	normal	Commercial	exploitation
What	is	the	meaning	of	“exploitation”	in	the	context	of	the	second	step	of	the	
test?		It	seems	fairly	straightforward:	any	use	of	the	work	by	which	the	copyright	
owner	 tries	 to	extract	or	maximize	 the	value	of	her	 right.119	“normal”	 is	more	
troublesome.	Does	 it	 refer	 to	what	 is	 simply	 “common”	 or	 does	 it	 refer	 to	 a	
normative	 standard?	 The	 question	 is	 relevant	 in	 particular	 for	 new	 forms	 and	
emerging	business	models	that	have	not	thus	far	been	common	or	“normal”	in	
an	empirical	sense.	as	noted	above,	at	the	revision	of	the	Berne Convention	in	
stockholm	in	1967,	the	concept	was	used	to	refer	to	“all	forms	of	exploiting	a	
work	which	[had],	or	[were]	likely	to	acquire,	considerable	economic	or	practical	
importance.”120			
professor	paul	Goldstein	notes	that	the	purpose	of	the	second	step	is	to	
“fortify	 authors’	 interests	 in	 their	 accustomed	markets	 against	 local	 legislative	
inroads.”121	It	thus	seems	that	the	condition	is	normative	in	nature:	an	exception	
is	 not	 allowed	 if	 it	 covers	 any	 form	 of	 exploitation	 which	 has,	 or	 is	 likely	 to	
acquire,	considerable	importance.	In	other	words,	if	the	exception	is	used	to	limit	
a	commercially	significant	market	or,	a fortiori,	to	enter	into	competition	with	the	
copyright	holder,	the	exception	is	prohibited.122		
professor	Mihály	 ficsor	 and	 the	WTO	panel	 on	 the	Us	 section	 110(5)	
case	agreed	with	this	approach.	The	WTO	panel	concluded	as	follows:
[I]t	appears	that	one	way	of	measuring	the	normative	connotation	of	normal	
exploitation	 is	 to	 consider,	 in	 addition	 to	 those	 forms	 of	 exploitation	 that	
currently	generate	significant	or	tangible	revenue,	those	forms	of	exploitation	
which,	 with	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 likelihood	 and	 plausibility,	 could	 acquire	
considerable	economic	or	practical	importance.123
118.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note	95	at	p.	1145		
119.	 Ficsor,	The Law of Copyright and the Internet,	supra note	94	at	s.	5.56.
120.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note	95	at	p.	112.
121.	 Paul	Goldstein,	International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford	University	Press,	1998)	at	p.	295.	
See	also	Ficsor,	The Law of Copyright and the Internet, supra note	94	at	p.	516.	
122.	 One	could	see	the	scope	of	an	exception	based	on	non-commercially	significant	use	in	the	Database and 
Collections of Information Misappropriation Act	(USA	2003),	Bill	H.R.	3261,	108th	Congress,	<http://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.3261.IH:>	at	s.	4(b)	which	would	allow:	the	making	available	in	commerce	
of	a	substantial	part	of	a	database	by	a	nonprofit	educational,	scientific,	and	research	institution,	including	
an	employee	or	agent	of	such	institution	acting	within	the	scope	of	such	employment	or	agency,	for	
nonprofit	educational,	scientific,	and	research	purposes	[…]	if	the	court	determines	that	the	making	
available	in	commerce	of	the	information	in	the	database	is	reasonable	under	the	circumstances,	taking	into	
consideration	the	customary	practices	associated	with	such	uses	of	such	database	by	nonprofit	educational,	
scientific,	or	research	institutions	and	other	factors	that	the	court	determines	relevant.
123.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109	at	para.	6.180.
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The	impact	of	the	second	step	on	specific	exceptions	is	discussed	below.
3.2.3.		Unreasonable	prejudice	to	Legitimate	Interests	of	rightsholder
The	third	step	is	perhaps	the	most	difficult	to	interpret.	What	is	an	“unreasonable	
prejudice”	and	what	are	“legitimate	interests”?	
Let	us	start	with	the	term	“legitimate.”	 It	could	have	two	meanings:	 (a)	
conformable	 to,	 sanctioned	or	authorized	by	 law	or	principle;	 lawful;	 justifiable;	
proper;	or	(b)	normal,	regular,	conformable	to	a	recognized	type,	according	to	the	
Oxford English Dictionary.	To	put	it	differently,	are	legitimate	interests	only	“legal	
interests”?	If	a	broader	view	of	the	interests	involved	is	preferred,	the	third	step	
would	then	reflect	the	need	to	balance	the	rights	of	copyright	holders	and	users.124
at	the	1967	stockholm	Conference,	the	United	Kingdom	took	the	view	
that	legitimate	meant	simply	“sanctioned	by	law,”	while	other	countries	seemed	
to	take	a	broader	view	of	the	term	as	meaning	“supported	by	social	norms	and	
relevant	 public	 policies.”125	 The	WTO	panel126	 adjudicating	 on	 the	Us	 section	
110(5)	 case	concluded	 that	 the	combination	of	 the	notion	of	“prejudice”	with	
that	of	“interests”	pointed	clearly	 towards	what	 the	WTO	panel	 refers	 to	as	a	
“legal-normative”	 approach,	 one	 with	 clear	 positivist	 overtones.	 “Legitimate	
interests,”	the	panel	concluded,	are	simply	those	that	are	protected	by	law.	
This	 leaves	 open	 one	 key	 question:	 	 what	 is	 an	 “unreasonable”	
prejudice?127	 Clearly,	 the	 word	 “unreasonable”	 indicates	 that	 some level	 or	
degree	 of	 prejudice	 is	 justified.	 for	 example,	 while	 a	 country	 might	 exempt	
entirely	the	making	of	a	small	number	of	private	copies,	 it	may	be	required	to	
impose	 a	 compensation	 scheme,	 such	 as	 a	 levy,	 when	 the	 prejudice	 level	
becomes	 unjustified.128	 To	 buttress	 this	 view,	 the	 french	 version	 of	 the	Berne 
Convention,	 which	 governs	 in	 case	 of	 a	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 linguistic	
versions,129	uses	the	expression	“ne cause pas un préjudice injustifié,”	which	one	
would	 translate	 literally	 as	 “does	 not	 cause	 an	 unjustified	 prejudice.”	 The	
Convention	translators	opted	instead	for	“does	not	unreasonably	prejudice.”130	
	
124.	 To	the	same	effect,	see	Martin	Senftleben,	Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of 
the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (Kluwer,	2004),	at	pp.	226–227:
	 [C]	opyright	law	is	centred	round	the	delicate	balance	between	grants	and	reservations.	On	one	
side	of	 this	balance,	 the	economic	and	non-economic	 interests	of	 authors	of	 already	existing	
works	can	be	found.	On	the	other	side,	the	interests	of	users—a	group	encompassing	authors	
wishing	to	build	upon	the	work	of	their	predecessors—are	located.	If	a	proper	balance	between	
the	concerns	of	authors	and	users	is	to	be	struck,	both	sides	must	necessarily	take	a	step	towards	
the	 centre.	 The	 two	 elements	 of	 the	 third	 criterion	 [legitimate	 interests	 and	 unreasonable	
prejudice]	mirror	these	two	steps.	The	authors	cannot	assert	each	and	every	concern.	 Instead,	
only	 legitimate	 interests	 are	 relevant.	 As	 a	 countermove,	 the	 users	 recognise	 that	 copyright	
limitations	in	their	favour	must	keep	within	reasonable	limits.	 	
125.	 Ficsor,	“How	Much	of	What,”	supra	note	101,	at	p.	143.
126.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109	at	paras.	6.223–6.229.		At	para.	6.224	the	panel	
somehow	tried	to	reconcile	the	two	approaches:	
	 [T]he	term	relates	to	lawfulness	from	a	legal	positivist	perspective,	but	it	has	also	the	connotation	of	
legitimacy	from	a	more	normative	perspective,	in	the	context	of	calling	for	the	protection	of	interests	
that	are	justifiable	in	the	light	of	the	objectives	that	underlie	the	protection	of	exclusive	rights.
127.	 It	is	worth	noting	that	“not	unreasonable	prejudice”	is	not	quite	the	same	as	“reasonable	prejudice.”	The	
Panel	noted	that	“‘[n]ot	unreasonable’	connotes	a	slightly	stricter	threshold	than	‘reasonable’.”		(United 
States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109	at	para.	6.225).		It	seems	to	assume	that	prejudice	is	
unreasonable	unless	shown	otherwise. 
128.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference,	supra note	95	at	883.
129.	 Berne Convention,	supra	note	4	at	art.	37(1)(c).
130.	 Records of the Stockholm Conference,	supra	note	95	at	p.	1145,	s.	84.
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The	inclusion	of	a	 justification	criterion,	which	is	present	 in	the	french	version,	
would	 allow	 legislators	 to	establish	 a	balance	between,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	
rights	of	authors	and	other	copyright	holders	and,	on	the	other,	the	needs	and	
interests	of	users.	In	other	words,	there must be a public interest justification	to	
limit	copyright.	
Unfortunately,	the	WTO	panel	essentially	conflated	the	second	and	third	
steps	 when	 it	 concluded	 that	 “prejudice	 to	 the	 legitimate	 interests	 of	 right	
holders	reaches	an	unreasonable	level	if	an	exception	or	limitation	causes	or	has	
the	potential	to	cause	an	unreasonable	loss	of	income	to	the	copyright	owner.”131	
a	public	interest	imperative	may	lead	a	government	to	impose	an	exception	to	
copyright	 that	 may	 translate	 into	 a	 loss	 of	 revenue	 for	 copyright	 holders.	 To	
ensure	that	the	prejudice	is	not	unreasonable,	a	compensation	mechanism	must	
then	be	established.132	
3.2.4.	Market-Oriented	Impacts
The	 net	 result	 of	 the	WTO	 decisions	 is	 that	 any	 exception	 to	 copyright (i.e.	
without	 compensation	 to	 the	 rightsholders)	 must	 be	 measured	 against	 any	
demonstrable	loss	of	income	for	rightsholders.	The	policy	tool	that	would	seem	
best	to	embody	this	is	to	situate	the	exception	on	an	income	stream	target.	at	
the	centre	of	the	target	are	core	income	streams.	To	translate	this	in	commercial	
terms,	would	the	exception	significantly	limit	existing	sales	or	licensing	income	
or,	under	the	second	step,	prevent	the	rightsholder	from	trying	to	sell	or	license	
their	 copyright	 rights	 (i.e.	 the	 “trial	 and	 error”	 establishment	 of	 commercial	
exploitation)?	any	 exception	 that	 results	 in	 either	 of	 these	 two	possibilities	 is	
almost	certainly	incompatible	with	the	second	and	probably	also	the	third	step	
of	the	test.	exceptions	that	demonstrably	affect	significant	income	streams	also	
interfere	with	normal	commercial	exploitation,	unless	no	commercial	transaction	
or	 license	 is	possible	 under	 the	 circumstances.	 To	pass	 the	 test,	 an	exception	
must	 thus	be	narrowly	defined	 (the	 first	 step)	and	 touch	essentially	peripheral	
income	streams.	
131.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109	at	para. 6.229.
132.	 This	is	reinforced	by	a	later	finding	by	an	arbitration	panel,	which	had	been	convened	to	decide	the	level	of	
harm	caused	by	the	US	refusal	to	modify	its	law	to	bring	it	into	conformity	with	the	Panel’s	findings.	Under	
the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Understanding	(DSU)	that	governs	the	WTO	dispute-settlement	process,	a	
party	may	ask	for	arbitration	if	another	party	fails	to	implement	an	adopted	panel	(or	Appellate	Body)	
decision.	Because	the	US	failed	to	implement	the	Panel	report,	the	European	Union	asked	for	arbitration	and	
a	decision	on	the	level	of	harm,	which	was	determined	to	be	approximately	$1.3	million	per	year.	The	
European	Union	has	proposed	levying	a	fee	on	copyrighted	material	against	United	States	nationals	unless	
the	United	States	reforms	its	law.	See	United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (Complaint by 
the European Communities)	(1	March	2002)	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS160/22	(Communication	from	the	Arbitrator),	
<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS160%FC%2A
%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D22%2EDOC%2EHTM>;	United 
States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (Complaint by the European Communities)	(19	February	
2002),	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS160/21	(Note	by	the	Secretariat),	<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.
asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS160%FC%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2
FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D21%2EDOC%2EHTM>;	United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act 
(Complaint by the European Communities)	(11	January	2002),	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS160/19	(Recourse	by	the	
European	Communities	to	Article	22.2	of	the	DSU),	<http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu
=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS160%FC%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2
FDS%2F160%2D19%2EDOC%2EHTM>;	United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act (Complaint 
by the European Communities)	(15	January	2001),	WTO	Doc.	WT/DS160/12	(Award	of	the	Arbitrator),	<http://
docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS160%FC%2A%29&d
oc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F160%2D12%2EDOC%2EHTM>.
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Could	 a	 public	 interest	 justification	 “compensate”	 for	 prima facie	
incompatibility?	a	 limitation	 (with	 compensation	 negating	 the	 loss	 of	 income)	
would	pass	the	third	step	of	the	test.	however,	meeting	the	requirements	of	the	
second	 step	 is	 more	 difficult.	 If	 a	 rightsholder	 can	 show	 that	 the	 exception	
prevents	 him	 from	 exploiting	 a	 “market,”	 then	 the	 normative	 quality	 of	 the	
justification	would	not	necessarily	compensate	for	the	lost	income.	It	becomes	a	
matter	of	degree	and,	yes,	balance.
That	said,	“public	 interest”	remains	completely	relevant.	as	part	I	has	
endeavoured	 to	 demonstrate,	 it	 has	 always	 formed	 part	 of	 international	
copyright	law	and	policy.	It	was	also	used	successfully	as	a	defence	in	a	few	UK	
cases,	but	those	cases	dealt	with	particular	works	(for	example,	a	photograph	of	
princess	Diana	on	the	day	of	her	accident	or	 the	text	of	a	ministerial	briefing	
note	133)	and	not	with	classes	of	works	or	users.	In	addition,	in	those	cases	users	
had	 a	 positive	 right	 to	 exercise	 against	 the	 copyright:	 namely,	 freedom	 of	
expression	and	information.
It	would	thus	be	theoretically	possible	to	consider	a	provision	allowing	
courts	not	to	enforce	copyright	when	a	countervailing	public	interest	justification	
supports	this	application.	Others	might	argue	that	this	 is	unnecessary	because	
courts	 can	 (based	 on	 equitable	 rules)	 refuse	 certain	 remedies	 (for	 example,	
injunctions).	More	importantly,	such	an	“exceptional	cases”	exception	would	not	
address	broader	concerns	in	education,	research,	or	other	similar	areas.		
In	 sum,	 the	 three-step	 test	 restricts	 the	availability	of	uncompensated	
exceptions.134	 The	 second	 step	 prohibits	 open-ended	 exceptions	 that	
demonstrably	affect	core	or	significant	income	streams.			
how	 can	 a	 rightsholder	 demonstrate	 the	 existence	of	 a	market?	 	 If	 a	
market	is	already	established	in	Canada	for	the	form	of	exploitation	concerned,	
then	the	burden	of	proof	 is	easily	met.	 If	that	 is	not	the	case,	the	rightsholder	
could	 demonstrate	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 market	 in	 a	 different	 yet	 relevant	
jurisdiction.	 for	 example,	 if	 a	 Us	 rightsholder	 could	 show	 that	 an	 important	
market	is	successfully	exploited	in	the	United	states,	but	that	the	rightholder	is	
prevented	from	doing	so	in	Canada	because	of	an	exception,	then	prima facie	
incompatibility	is	established.	
a	 more	 difficult	 question	 is	 the	 impact	 on	 prospective	 markets.	
Interpreting	 the	 test	 as	 applying	 only	 to	 established	 markets	 might	 stifle	
investment	in	new	technology	and	new	markets.	Conversely,	interpreting	the	test	
to	 consider	 interference	with	 any	prospective	market,	 no	matter	 how	 remote,	
would	basically	prohibit	almost	all	exceptions.	The	test	does	not	go	that	far.	first,	
the	 interference	must	affect	an	 income	stream	 (whether	actual	or	prospective)	
133.	 Ashdown v Telegraph Group, Ltd.,	2001	EWCA	Civ	1142,	<http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/
ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1142.html&query=ashdown&method=boolean>,	2002	Law Reports, Chancery 
Division	149,	2002:6	Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark Cases	235;	Hyde Park Residence Ltd v 
Yelland et al.,	2000	EWCA	Civ	37,	<http://www.bailii.org/cgi-`bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/
Civ/2000/37.html&query=Hyde+and+Park+and+Residence+and+Limited&method=boolean>,	2001	Law	
Reports,	Chancery	Division	143,	(2000)	Entertainment	and	Media	Law	Reports	363.
134.	 As	Okediji	notes	in	“Toward	An	International	Fair	Use	Doctrine,”	(2000)	39	Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law	75–176,	at	p.	112:		
	 The	option	of	using	compulsory	licensing	under	the	auspices	of	Article	9(2)	places	some	pressure	
on	the	interpretation	of	what	qualifies	as	a	“special	case”	particularly	where	free	use	is	permitted	
by	 national	 legislation	 as	 is	 the	 case	with	 the	American	 fair	 use	 doctrine.	 The	possibility	 of	 a	
compulsory	 license	 scheme	 under	 Article	 9(2)	 suggests	 that	 the	 Berne	 Convention	 does	 not	
generally	favor	“free	use”	as	a	legitimate	paradigm	for	access	to	copyrighted	works.	
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that	 is	 sufficiently	close	 to	 the	centre	of	 the	 target.	 	 	second,	 the	prospective	
market	must	be	reasonably	predictable.135	
3.3. Impact of the Test on Policy 
The	first	lesson	to	be	drawn	is	that	the	three-step	test	is	in	reality	a	two-step	test	
when	applied	directly	 in	national	 law	because	 the	“special	 case”	nature	of	 an	
exception	 is	but	an	 instruction	addressed	 to	 lawmakers	 to	provide	 reasonably	
narrow	exceptions	(a	quantitative	component),	with	a	well-defined	public	interest	
justification	 (the	 normative/qualitative	 component).	 as	 in	 the	 section	 110(5)	
case,136	the	first	step	may	be	used	(here	by	a	WTO	panel)	to	decide	whether	an	
exception	 is	 sufficiently	 narrow.	 This	 argues	 against	 open-ended	 exceptions	
because	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 defend	 an	 exception	 when	 its	 outer	 limits,	 whether	 in	
quantity	or	purpose,	cannot	be	readily	ascertained.	
The	 second	 step	 of	 the	 test	 prohibits	 exceptions	 that	 interfere	
demonstrably	with	commercial	exploitation.	The	focus	here	is	akin	to	a	finding	of	
adverse	 trade	 impact	 in	 an	 antidumping	 case:137	will	 the	measure	 significantly	
prevent	a	rightsholder	from	maximizing	revenue?	It	is	clear	from	all	interpretations	
of	 the	 test	 that	normalcy	of	exploitation	modes	 is	not	 a	purely	empirical	 (and	
then	 necessarily	 mostly	 historical)	 notion.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 not	 simply	 a	
question	of	what	modes	are	actively	exploited	now,	but	also	of	what	modes	are	
likely	to	become	significant	income	streams.	To	recall	the	stockholm	Conference’s	
phrase	noted	above,	the	test	covers	“all	forms	of	exploiting	a	work	which	had,	
or	were	likely	to	acquire,	considerable	economic	or	practical	importance.”		
Determining	what	is	likely	to	acquire	importance	is	educated	guesswork.	
however,	courts	should	 look	at	market	developments	and	ask	rightsholders	to	
make	at	least	a	prima facie	case	of	interference.	Once	the	case	has	been	made,	
however,	 it	would	seem	reasonable	that	the	burden	should	shift	to	the	user	to	
show	that	there	is	no	interference.	
The	 third	 step	 is	 a	 logical	 extension	 of	 the	 second:	 If	 there	 is	 no	
interference	 because	 the	 exception	 does	 not	 significantly	 impinge	 upon	 the	
rightsholders’	mode(s)	of	commercial	exploitation,	then	perhaps	the	rightsholders	
can	still	show	a	substantial	loss	of	income.	If	that	loss	of	income	is	unreasonable,	
then	financial	compensation	should	be	provided.
	 Both	the	incorporation	of	the	three-step	test	in	international	copyright	
law	by	the	TrIps	agreement	(which	went	well	beyond	the	Berne Convention	in	
this	regard)	and,	more	broadly,	the	movement	of	copyright	from	a	property	right	
based	on	natural	law	to	a	trade-related	right	may	have	made	it	easier	to	provide	
exceptions.	This	is	because	the	approach	taken	is	not,	or	is	no	longer,	concerned	
with	the	theoretical	interference	with	a	property	right	(by	analogy,	actual	damage	
is	not	required	to	establish	a	cause	of	action	in	trespass	to	land),	but	is	rather	a	
pragmatic	approach	involving	the	actual	impact	on	rightsholders.
135.	 As	was	decided	by	the	French	Supreme	Civil	Court	in	2006	(Cour de cassation):	Cassation	Civile	1re,	28	
February	2006,	<http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_publications_documentation_2/actualite_
jurisprudence_21/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arrets_569/05_16.002_8777.html>,	La Semaine Juridique: 
Juris Classeur Periodique		2006.	II.	10084	(Annot.	A.	Lucas).	
136.	 See	United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109.
137.	 I	use	this	analogy	because	the	incorporation	of	copyright	rules	in	the	WTO	framework,	where	disputes	are	
decided	by	trade	experts,	leads	to	a	rapprochement	of	trade	and	intellectual	property	rules.	
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put	differently,	as	a	result	of	the	paradigmatic	nature	of	the	three-step	
test,	 the	 policy	 focus	 is	 not	 whether	 a	 technical	 restricted	 act	 (reproduction,	
adaptation,	communication,	etc.)	has	taken	place,	but:	(a)	whether	revenue	will	
be	 (demonstrably)	 lost	 because	 of	 lost	 (normal,	 i.e.	 reasonably	 expected)	
commercial	 transactions;	and	 (b)	whether	 the	 loss	 is	proportionally	 justified	on	
public	 policy	 grounds.	 One	 then	 looks	 at	 how	 many	 dollars	 will	 be	 lost	 and	
whether	a	compensation	mechanism	should	be	put	in	place.	
3.4. Scope of Application of the Three-Step Test
One	crucial	issue	that	remains	after	the	above	analysis	of	the	three-step	test	is	to	
determine	 to	which	exceptions	and	 limitations	 the	 test	applies.	specifically,	 to	
which	limitations	and	exceptions	does	the	test	as	it	is	contained	in	article	13	of	
the	TrIps	agreement	apply,	in	a	dispute-settlement	context	in	particular?	first,	
does	it	apply	to	exceptions	existing	at	the	time	the	TrIps	agreement	came	into	
force	or	only	to	those	adopted	afterwards	(January	1,	1995	for	countries	other	
than	 developing	 and	 least-developed	 ones)?138	 second,	 does	 it	 apply	 only	 to	
general	 exceptions	 or	 also	 to	 use-	 or	 user-specific	 exceptions	 provided	 for	
specifically	in	the	Berne Convention	or	the	TrIps	agreement?	The	answer	to	the	
first	question	was	given	in	the	110(5)	case:139	the	test	applies	both	to	exceptions	
in	place	at	the	time	of	entry	into	force	and	those	adopted	afterwards.	
The	 second	 question	 is	 more	 difficult	 to	 answer.	 It	 would	 seem	
unnecessary	to	apply	the	three-step	test	as	a	further	barrier	to	validity	because,	
as	a	matter	of	treaty	interpretation,	exceptions	such	as	articles	10(1)	and	10(2)	of	
the	Convention	 include	a	different	 test,	 namely	 the	 reference	 to	 compatibility	
with	 fair	practice.	While	 this	position	 is	defensible,	 it	does	not	 solve	 the	 issue	
entirely.	respected	commentators	have	expressed	the	view	that	this	reference	to	
“fair	practice”	 should	be	 interpreted	as	a	 rule	of	 reason	 referring	back	 to	 the	
three-step	test.140	This	view	may	be	adopted	by	a	WTO	panel,	notably	to	simplify	
and	enhance	the	uniformity	of	standards	used	to	interpret	the	Berne Convention	
(and	in	turn	by	the	TrIps	agreement	in	which	it	was	incorporated).	
additionally,	 those	 specific	 exceptions	 contain	 other	 limitations.	 first,	
with	regards	to	the	use	of	the	words	“by	way	of	illustration,”	there	is	controversy	
as	 to	 whether	 the	 whole	 of	 a	 work	 may	 be	 used	 “for	 illustration.”	 however,	
leading	commentators	believe	that,	in	appropriate	circumstances,	the	use	of	an	
entire	work	may	be	acceptable.141second,	records	from	the	successive	revision	
Conferences	of	the	Berne Convention	show	that	“teaching”	as	used	in	article	10	
comprises	elementary	as	well	as	advanced	teaching	and	works	intended	for	self-
instruction.142	But	 there	 is	considerable	debate	as	 to	whether	commercial	 (for-
profit)	teaching	activities	can	benefit	from	the	exception.143	finally,	article	10(2)	
extends	 the	 exception	 to	 include	 works	 in	 a	 broadcast	 for	 schools	 or	 other	
138.	 TRIPS	Agreement,	supra	note	5	at	art.	65.
139.	 United States—Section 110(5) Panel Report,	supra	note	109	at	para.	6.94	(“neither	the	express	wording	nor	the	
context	of	Article	13	or	any	other	provision	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	supports	the	interpretation	that	the	scope	
of	application	of	Article	13	is	limited	to	the	exclusive	rights	newly	introduced	under	the	TRIPS	Agreement.”)
140.	 Ricketson	and	Ginsburg,	International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,	supra	note	106	at	s.	13.45.
141.	 Ricketson	and	Ginsburg,	International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,	supra	note	106	at	s.	13.45.	
142.	 Ricketson	and	Ginsburg,	International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,	supra	note	106	at	s.	13.45.
143.	 Ricketson	and	Ginsburg,	International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,	supra	note	106	at	s.	13.45;	
Thomas	Dreier	and	P	Bernt	Hugenholtz,	eds,	Concise European Copyright Law	(Kluwer	Law,	2006)	at	p.	45.	
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educational	 institutions,	but	 not	 to	on-demand	 transmissions.	 The	Convention	
treats	broadcasting	and	transmissions	(article	11bis(1))	differently.144
The	 three-step	 test	 thus	may	 apply	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 reason	
contained	 in	 articles	 10(1)	 and	 10(2)	 of	 the	 Berne Convention	 through	 the	
reference	 to	 fair	 practice.	 Conversely,	 because	 the	 exceptions	 contained	 in	
articles	10bis(1)145	and	(2)146	of	the	Convention	do	not	contain	this	reference	to	
fair	practice,	they	would	not	be	subject	to	the	three-step	test.	however,	article	
10bis(1)	allows	rightsholders	to	prevent	recourse	to	this	 	exception	and	article	
10bis(2)	includes	a	reference	to	the	justification	of	the	extent	of	the	use,	which	
seems	to	be	a	different	and	less	demanding	threshold	than	the	three-step	test.	
another	consideration	is	whether	the	test	applies	to	limitations	expressly	
provided	for	in	the	Berne Convention,	such	as	compulsory	licences	for	mechanical	
reproduction	or	retransmission.	There	are	two	reasons	to	think	it	would	not.	That	
being	said,	there	is	also	a	strong	reason	to	think	it	would:	article	13	of	the	TrIps	
agreement	provides	that	WTO	Members	must	“confine	limitations	or	exceptions”	
(generally)	 to	 those	 that	 pass	 the	 three	 steps	 of	 the	 test.	 at	 first	 glance,	 this	
covers	all	limitations	and	exceptions,	including	compulsory	licenses.	Indeed,	the	
history	 of	 article	 13	 suggests	 a	 broad	 scope	 of	 application,	 including	 to	 all	
so-called	minor	exceptions	and	a	prohibition	of	compulsory	licenses	other than	
those	 expressly	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 Convention.147	 There,	 are	 however,	 two	
arguments	 not	 to	 apply	 the	 test	 to	 licenses	 expressly	 provided	 for	 in	 the	
Convention.	first,	the	Convention	specifically	expresses	those	limitations	in	clear,	
unlimited	terms,	though	using	different	legal	techniques.148	second,	especially	if	
the	 application	 of	 the	 three-step	 test	 is	 applied	 to	 an	 exception	 otherwise	
provided	in	the	Convention,	then	arguably	it	must	be	read	contextually,	looking	
at	 the	Convention	 in	 its	entirety.	 In	cases	where	the	Convention	combines	the	
grant	of	a	right	with	a	possible	compulsory	license,	the	right	is	arguably	not,	or	
is	 no	 longer,	 exclusive.	 article	 13	 of	 the	 TrIps	 agreement	 applies	 only	 to	
“exclusive	rights.”	additionally,	as	a	matter	of	 internal	coherence,	while	 it	may	
make	 sense	 to	 apply	 the	 test	 “across	 the	board,”	 as	 it	were,	why	provide	 for	
some,	 but	 not	 all,	 possible	 exceptions	 in	 the	Convention	 and	 the	agreement	
(and	then	superimpose	the	three-step	test)?	
It	should	also	be	mentioned	that	the	test	would	not	apply	to	exclusions 
from copyright protection,	such	as	those	contained	in	articles	2(2),	2(4),	2(7)	and	
2bis(1)	of	the	Berne Convention	(respectively	unfixed	works;	“official	texts	of	a	
legislative,	 administrative	 and	 legal	 nature,	 and	 to	 official	 translations	 of	 such	
144.	 Ricketson	and	Ginsburg,	International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights,	supra note	106	at	s.	13.45. 
145.	 Berne Convention,	supra	note	4	at	art.	10bis(1):	
	 reproduction	 by	 the	 press,	 the	 broadcasting	 or	 the	 communication	 to	 the	 public	 by	 wire	 of	
articles	published	in	newspapers	or	periodicals	on	current	economic,	political	or	religious	topics,	
and	of	broadcast	works	of	the	same	character,	in	cases	in	which	the	reproduction,	broadcasting	
or	such	communication	thereof	is	not	expressly	reserved.
146.	 Berne Convention,	supra	note	4	at	art.	10bis(2):	reproduction	and	making	available	to	the	public	“for	the	
purpose	of	reporting	current	events	by	means	of	photography,	cinematography,	broadcasting	or	
communication	to	the	public	by	wire,	literary	or	artistic	works	seen	or	heard	in	the	course	of	the	event	may,	
to	the	extent	justified	by	the	informatory	purpose	[…].”
147.	 Gervais,	The TRIPS Agreement,	supra	note	101	at	pp.	144–147.	
148.	 Berne Convention,	supra	note	4:	In	arts.	11bis(2)	and	(3),	the	Convention	uses	the	ubiquitous	“[i]t	shall	be	a	
matter	for	legislation	in	the	countries	of	the	Union	to	determine	the	conditions	[…]”,	while	in	art.	13(1),	it	is	
expressed	as	a	possible	reservation	or	condition:	“Each	country	of	the	Union	may	impose	for	itself	
reservations	and	conditions	on	the	exclusive	right	granted	to	the	author	of	a	musical	work	[…].”
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texts”;	works	of	applied	art;	and	“political	speeches	and	speeches	delivered	in	
the	 course	 of	 legal	 proceedings”)	 or	 in	 article	 9(2)	 of	 the	 TrIps	 agreement	
(“ideas,	procedures,	methods	of	operation	or	mathematical	concepts	as	such”).	
Those	are	not	limitations	or	exceptions	to	exclusive	copyright	rights	proper,	but	
are	rather	statements	of	exclusion	of	subject	matter.	In	other	words,	the	provision	
deals	with	the	type	of	works	to	which	copyright	applies	and	not	to	the	scope	of	
rights,	which	is	the	focus	of	limitations	and	exceptions	(as	the	term	is	used	in	the	
Berne Convention	and	this	article).
3.5. Locus of the Three-Step Test
a	question	closely	related	to	the	issue	of	whether	the	three-step	test	applies	in	
addition	to	the	(few)	additional	exceptions	contained	in	the	Berne Convention	is	
at	which	level	it	applies.	Is	it	merely	an	international	norm	or	does	it,	or	could	it,	
apply	at	the	national	level?149	In	countries	where	international	treaty	norms	are	
directly	applicable	in	the	national	legal	order,	this	would	be	the	case,	which	raises	
interesting	 interpretative	 issues.	Clearly,	however,	 the	direct	application	of	 the	
test	in	national	legislation	is	becoming	more	widespread.	
The	 european	 Union’s	 Information	 society	 (“Infosoc”)	 Directive150	
contains	exceptions	that	are	all	purpose-specific.	In	other	words,	there	is	no	set	
of	criteria	comparable	to	the	Us	fair	use	doctrine.151	however,	the	preamble	to	
this	Directive,	which	serves	as	a	guideline	for	the	interpretation	of	the	operative	
part	of	the	text,152	refers	to	“permitting		exceptions	or	limitations	in	the	public	
interest	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 education	 and	 teaching”153	 and	 to	 the	 need	 to	
safeguard	a	“fair	balance	of	rights	and	interests	between	the	different	categories	
of	rightsholders,	as	well	as	between	the	different	categories	of	rightsholders	and	
users”154	through	exceptions	and	limitations,	which	“have	to	be	reassessed	in	the	
light	of	the	new	electronic	environment.”155	The	Infosoc	Directive	also	refers	to	
the	 three-step	 test	as	an	overarching	 test	 for	all	permitted	exceptions.	article	
5(5)	reads:	
The	exceptions	and	limitations	provided	for	in	paragraphs	1,	2,	3	and	4	shall	
only	be	applied	in	certain	special	cases	which	do	not	conflict	with	a	normal	
exploitation	 of	 the	work	 or	 other	 subject	matter	 and	 do	 not	 unreasonably	
prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	rightholder.156
149.	 In	the	now	famous	Mulholland	Drive	case,	a	consumer	organization	argued	that	anti-circumvention	
technology	(TPM)	prevented	the	making	of	a	(lawful)	private	copy.	The	Court	of	First	Instance	in	Paris	
refused	to	grant	the	relief	sought.	The	Paris	Court	of	Appeal	disagreed	and	concluded	that	there	was	no	
evidence	that	private	copying	would	interfere	with	normal	commercial	exploitation.	The	Civil	Supreme	
Court	(cour	de	cassation)	found	that	copying	of	digital	copies	of	a	film	could	constitute	a	violation	of	at	
least	the	second	step	(normal	commercial	exploitation):	M. Stéphane P., UFC Que Choisir c/ SA Films Alain 
Sarde, SA Universal pictures video France et autres,	Cassation	Civile	3e,	30	April	2004,	<http://www.
foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/tgi-par20040430.pdf>,	“Attendu	que	la	copie	d’une	œuvre 
filmographique éditée sur support numérique ne peut ainsi que porter atteinte à l’exploitation normale de 
l’œuvre”	(emphasis	added). Note	the	double	negative.
150.	 EC,	Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society,	(2001)	Official 
Journal of the European Union L	167/10,	<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:
167:0010:0019:EN:PDF>	[InfoSoc Directive].	
151.	 US Copyright Act,	supra	note	8	at	s.	107.
152.	 InfoSoc Directive,	supra	note	150,	preamble.
153.	 InfoSoc Directive,	supra	note	150	at	para.	14.
154.	 InfoSoc Directive,	supra	note	150	at	para.	31.
155.	 Infosoc Directive,	supra	note	150	at	para.	31.
156.	 Infosoc Directive,	supra	note	150	at	art.	5,	para.	5.
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The	reference	to	the	test	is	seen	as	a	“guiding	principle”	rather	than	an	
effective	means	to	effectively	harmonize	exceptions	in	the	national	laws	of	the	27	
eU	Member	states.157	 Indeed,	at	the	 level	of	national	 laws,	the	three-step	test	
may	be	refined	by	enumerating	certain	specific	cases158	or	by	providing	additional	
guidance	on	the	interpretation	of	the	three	steps.	It	remains	a	flexible	test	that	
could,	 however,	 be	 used	by	 courts	 in	 cases	where	 no	 such	 specific	 exception	
exists,	if	permitted	under	domestic	law.	The	eU	reference	to	the	three-step	test	
in	the	Infosoc	Directive	may	also	be	interpreted	as	a	commitment	to	the	test	as	
a	guide	for	regional	policy,	but	not	necessarily	as	the	expression	of	the	view	that	
it	is	the	best	normative	tool	at	the	level	of	national	laws.	
The	Infosoc	Directive	is	not	the	first	to	refer	to	the	test.	a	version	of	the	
test	is	also	included	in	the	software	Directive,	where	it	is	used	both	as	a	guide	in	
the	preamble159	and	as	a	restriction	on	the	scope	of	exceptions	in	article	6(3).160	
It	is	also	contained	in	article	8(2)	of	the	Database	Directive,	where	it	forms	part	
of	the	main	provisions.161	
In	implementing	the	Infosoc	Directive,	a	number	of	eU	Member	states	
decided	to	include	the	test.	In	doing	so,	however,	they	usually	skipped	the	first	
step,	presumably	because	 they	 took	 the	 view162	 that	 there	are	 really	only	 two	
operational	steps.163	eU	countries	where	steps	2	and	3	form	part	of	national	law	
now	include	at	least:	Croatia,	france,	spain,	portugal,	and	Greece.			
There	is	another	clear	illustration	of	the	trend	to	incorporate	the	three-
step	 test	 in	 national	 legislation.	 In	 australia,	 the	 Copyright Amendment Act 
157.	 Senftleben,	Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test,	supra note	124	at	pp.	246–248.	
158.	 Bernt	Hugenholtz,	“Why	the	Copyright	Directive	Is	Unimportant,	and	Possibly	Invalid,”	(2000)	22:11	
European Intellectual Property Review 499–505,	<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/opinion-EIPR.
html	>	at	p.	501:	
	 What	 makes	 the	 Directive	 a	 total	 failure,	 in	 terms	 of	 harmonisation,	 is	 that	 the	 exemptions	
allowed	 under	Article	 5	 are	 optional,	 not	mandatory	 (except	 for	 5.1).	Member	 States	 are	 not	
obliged	to	implement	the	entire	list,	but	may	pick	and	choose	at	will.	 It	 is	expected	that	most	
Member	States	will	prefer	to	keep	intact	their	national	laws	as	much	as	possible.	At	best,	some	
countries	will	add	one	or	two	exemptions	from	the	list,	now	bearing	the	E.C.’s	seal	of	approval.	
So	much	for	approximation!		
	 See	also	an	illuminating	study	prepared	for	the	European	Commission	on	the	InfoSoc	Directive,	recently	
made	available	by	the	University	of	Amsterdam:	Institute	for	Information	Law,	Study on the Implementation 
and Effect in Member States’ Laws of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Final	Report)	(University	of	Amsterdam,	February	
2007),	<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/guibault/Infosoc_report_2007.pdf>.	
159.	 Computer Programs Directive,	supra	note	39	at	preamble:	“such	an	exception	to	the	author’s	exclusive	
rights	may	not	be	used	in	a	way	which	prejudices	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	rightholder	or	which	
conflicts	with	a	normal	exploitation	of	the	program	[…].”
160.	 Computer Programs Directive,	supra note	39	at	art.	6(3):	“the	provisions	of	this	Article	may	not	be	
interpreted	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	its	application	to	be	used	in	a	manner	which	unreasonably	prejudices	
the	right	holder’s	legitimate	interests	or	conflicts	with	a	normal	exploitation	of	the	computer	program.”
161.	 EC,	Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases,	(1996)	Official Journal of the European Union L	077,	002–0028,	<http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML>	at	art.	8(2):	
	 A	lawful	user	of	a	database	which	is	made	available	to	the	public	in	whatever	manner	may	not	
perform	acts	which	conflict	with	normal	exploitation	of	the	database	or	unreasonably	prejudice	
the	legitimate	interests	of	the	maker	of	the	database.		
162.	 Gervais,	The TRIPS Agreement,	supra	note	101	at	pp.	144–147.
163.	 The	Greek	copyright	law	also	contains	the	first	step.	See	Greece,	Law 2121/1993, Copyright, Related Rights 
and Cultural Matters,	as	last	amended	by	Law	No.	2435	of	2003,	<http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/
en/gr/gr219en.pdf	>	at	art.	28C	(added	by	art.	81(2)	of	Law	no.	3057/2002):	“The	limitations	provided	for	in	
Section	IV	of	Law	2121/1993,	as	exists,	shall	only	be	applied	in	certain	special	cases	which	do	not	conflict	
with	a	normal	exploitation	of	the	work	or	other	protected	subject-matter	and	do	not	unreasonably	prejudice	
the	legitimate	interests	of	the	rightholder.”
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2006,164	 which	 received	 royal	 assent	 on	 December	 11,	 2006,	 contains	 the	
following	provision:
section	200aB:	Use	of	works	and	other	subject-matter	for	certain	purposes
(1)	 The	copyright	in	a	work	or	other	subject-matter	is	not	infringed	by	a	
use	of	the	work	or	other	subject-matter	if	all	the	following	conditions	
exist:
(a)	 the	circumstances	of	the	use	(including	those	described	in		 	
	 	 paragraphs	(b),	(c)	and	(d))	amount to a special case;
(b)	the	use	is	covered	by	subsection	(2),	(3)	or	(4);
(c)	 the	use	does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work	or		
	 	 other	subject-matter;
(d)	the	use	does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests  
  of the owner of the copyright.
This	provision	applies	to	exceptions	contained	 in	that	section,	but	not	
(by	operation	of	sections	200aB(1)(b)	and	200aB(6))	if	the	use	of	the	work	is	non-
infringing	for	another	reason	(such	as	a	reproduction	of	 less	than	a	substantial	
part	or	a	limitation	on	the	right	itself,	as	for	example	in	the	provision	concerning	
the	making	of	a	Braille	version	of	a	published	literary	work,	which	contains	what	
amounts	to	a	compulsory	license).	
The	three-step	test	was	not	only	incorporated	in	the	australian	provision	
(all	 three	 steps,	 contrary	 to	most	 other	 national	 implementations	which	 focus	
only	 on	 the	 last	 two):	 it	 was	 a	 central	 consideration	 in	 preparing	 this	 Bill.	 In	
addition	to	being	addressed	directly	to	courts	in	section	200aB,	the	three-step	
test	was	used	to	justify	limitations	in	the	formulation	of	exceptions.	for	example,	
on	private	copying	the	Government	declared	during	the	debate	on	the	Bill:	“The	
‘one	 copy	 in	 each	 format’	 condition	 is	 to	 protect	 copyright	 owners	 from	 this	
exception	being	abused,	as	well	as	to	ensure	that	the	exception	complies	with	
the	three-step	test.”165
a	senate	Committee	struck	to	examine	the	constitutionality	of	the	Bill	
noted	that	it	had	“received	evidence	which	highlighted	opposing	views	on	how	
the	 three-step	 test	 should	 be	 implemented	 in	 domestic	 legislation.	 proposed	
section	200aB	seeks	 to	provide	an	open-ended	exception	 in	 line	with	 the	Us	
model,	 and	 allows	 courts	 to	 determine	 if	 other	 uses	 should	 be	 permitted	 as	
exceptions	to	copyright.”166	Critics	pointed	to	the	lack	of	clarity	of	the	test	and	
the	move	towards	a	“lawyer-based	copyright	regime—a	litigious	model.”167
164.	 Australia	(Commonwealth),	Copyright Amendment Act 2006,	no.	158,	<http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/E53C3691BD9BAA0ACA257307001B2EC7/$file/1582006.pdf>	(emphasis	added).
165.	 Submission	69A	to	the	Senate	Standing	Committee	on	Legal	and	Constitutional	Affairs	re	Provisions	of	the	
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006,	8	November	2006,	<http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/legcon_
ctte/copyright06/submissions/sub69A.pdf>	at	p.	3.	
166.	 Australia,	Commonwealth,	Senate,	Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs: 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 [Provisions],	(Report)	(Senate	Printing	Unit,	2006),	<http://www.aph.gov.au/
senate/committee/legcon_ctte/copyright06/report/report.pdf>	at	p.	24	[Senate	Report	on	Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2006].	
167.	 Senate	Report	on	Copyright Amendment Bill 2006,	supra	note	166	at	pp.	24–25. 
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The	Government’s	response	on	this	key	point	was	as	follows:
We	are	aware	that	some	user	interests	think	that	it	is	unduly	restrictive.	Given	
that	the	three-step	test	already	has	to	be	complied	with,	there	is	an	argument	
that	should	be	enough,	that	the	government	should	go	as	far	as	the	three-
step	 test	 allows.	 But	we	 note	 in	 passing	 that	 the	 three-step	 test	 is	 not	 an	
obligation;	 you	 only	 have	 to	 go	 as	 far	 as	 you	 can	 go	 under	 the	 treaty	
obligations.	 The	 government	 is	 also	 aware	 that	 some	 copyright	 owner	
interests	 think	 that	 the	 provision	 is	 too	 broad	 and	 that	 the	 commercial	
advantage	test	should	be	narrowed	even	further.	In	the	present	drafting	the	
government	has	sought	to	find	a	balance	between	those	interests,	recognising	
that	this	 is	a	new	exception	that	 is	different	 in	form	to	some	of	the	specific	
exceptions	 already	 in	 the	 Copyright	 act.	 Therefore,	 the	 government	 is	
minded	 to	 try	 to	balance	what	are	 reasonable	 interests	on	both	sides—the	
copyright	owners	and	users.	[…]
The	Government	introduced	the	“commercial	advantage”	test	in	recognition	
of	 concerns	 about	 the	 potential	 scope	 of	 the	 new	 exception.	 Indeed	 the	
Government	 notes	 arguments	 on	 behalf	 of	 some	 copyright	 owners	 that	 	
s.	 200aB	 is	 presently	 too	 wide	 in	 being	 potentially	 available	 to	 for-	 profit	
schools	 and	 libraries	 in	 commercial	 companies	 and	 should	be	narrowed	 so	
that	 no	 commercial	 advantage,	 direct	 or	 indirect,	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	
reliance	on	this	section.168
for	 its	 part,	 the	 Labor	 party	 (which,	 incidentally,	 has	 formed	 the	
government	since	november	24,	2007)	noted	the	following	in	the	senate	report:
Labor	senators	are	of	the	view	that	the	particular	way	the	Government	has	
chosen	 to	 embody	 the	 three-step	 test	 in	 the	 Bill	 is	 problematic	 and	 an	
example	of	poor	drafting	that	will	no	doubt	lead	to	confusion	and	uncertainty	
in	practice.	not	only	will	judges	be	required	to	interpret	the	three-step	test,	
but	so	will	the	users	to	which	the	exceptions	apply.	This	is	not	only	impractical,	
but	also	potentially	costly	to	those	user	groups	who	may	have	to	seek	expert	
advice	on	how	to	properly	interpret	the	three-step	test.169
The	 2006	 australian	 act	 is	 an	 almost	 ironclad	 guarantee	 of	 TrIps	
compatibility,	which	was	clearly	a	dominant	consideration	 in	making	the	policy	
decision.	 Only	 if	 australian	 courts	 were	 to	 stray	 too	 far	 from	 WTO	 panel	
interpretations	would	a	possible	case	of	incompatibility	with	TrIps	be	made.	This	
is	 highly	 unlikely	 because	 their	 deliberations	 will	 no	 doubt	 be	 guided	 in	 that	
respect	by	section	200aB(7),	which	defines	“conflict	with	a	normal	exploitation”	
and	 “unreasonably	 prejudice	 the	 legitimate	 interests”	 as	 having	 “the	 same	
meaning	as	in	article	13	of	the	TrIps	agreement.”	The	new	provision	is	still	too	
recent	to	have	been	interpreted	by	courts.	
168.	 Senate	Report	on	Copyright Amendment Bill 2006,	supra	note	166	at	pp.	25–26. 
169.	 Senate	Report	on	Copyright Amendment Bill 2006,	supra	note	166	at	p.	47.
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from	the	above,	a	few	concluding	observations	can	be	made.	first,	the	
three-step	test	is	emerging	as	an	unavoidable	norm	in	copyright	law	but	also	in	
other	 areas	 of	 intellectual	 property.170	 The	 test	 was	 originally	 conceived	 as	 a	
political	 compromise	 to	 limit	 exceptions	 to	 the	 right	 of	 reproduction.	 Its	
extension	 to	 all	 copyright	 rights	 and	 to	 other	 areas	 of	 intellectual	 property	 is	
likely	 a	 reflection	 of	 both	 the	 flexible	 nature	 of	 the	 test	 and	 the	 pragmatic	
approach	of	the	trade	negotiators	who	drafted	the	TrIps	agreement.	second,	
the	 locus	 of	 the	 test	 is	 unstable.	 There	 remains	 a	 considerable	 margin	 of	
uncertainty	with	respect	to	its	domestic	application	by	national	courts.	The	first	
step	is	generally	not	universally	viewed	as	a	message	addressed	to	law-makers	
to	narrow	the	scope	of	the	application	of	exceptions.	The	third	step	seems	to	
require	 compensation	 for	 exceptions	 that,	 while	 justified,	 cause	 a	 significant	
degree	of	harm.	This	could	 in	theory	be	 implemented	by	a	national	court,	but	
would	 be	 more	 appropriately	 the	 subject	 of	 arbitration	 or	 an	 administrative	
proceeding	(in	that	it	would	resemble	tariff-setting	processes).171	This	leaves	the	
second	 step,	 namely	 interference	 with	 normal	 commercial	 exploitation,	 a	
dynamic	and	evolving	notion,	at	the	center	of	the	picture.	
This	will	not	be	unfamiliar	to	those	familiar	with	fair	use	jurisprudence	in	
the	 United	 states	 and,	 more	 particularly,	 the	 Folsom	 test.172	 Courts	 must,	
according	to	Folsom,	“in	deciding	questions	of	this	sort,	look	to	the	nature	and	
objects	of	the	selections	made,	the	quantity	and	value	of	the	materials	used,	and	
the	degree	in	which	the	use	may	prejudice	the	sale,	or	diminish	the	profits,	or	
supersede	the	objects,	of	the	original	work.”173			
The	Us	fair	use	doctrine	was	codified	in	1976	and	“the	effect	of	the	use	
upon	the	potential	market	for	or	value	of	the	copyrighted	work”	is	the	fourth	and	
last	of	the	criteria	mentioned	in	section	107	of	the	Us	Copyright Act.174		In	Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises,175	the	Us	supreme	Court	stated	that	
the	 fourth	 factor	was	“undoubtedly	 the	 single	most	 important	element	of	 fair	
use,”176	adding	that	once	a	copyright	holder	had	established	“with	reasonable	
probability	the	existence	of	a	causal	connection	between	the	infringement	and	a	
loss	 of	 revenue,	 the	 burden	 properly	 shifts	 to	 the	 infringer	 to	 show	 that	 this	
damage	 would	 have	 occurred	 had	 there	 been	 no	 taking	 of	 copyrighted	
expression.”177
170.	 Including	patents	and	designs	in	TRIPS	Agreement,	supra	note	5	at	arts.	26	and	30.	
171.	 For	example,	in	the	United	States	see	Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004,	Pub.	L.	no.	
108-419,	<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_
laws&docid=f:publ419.108.pdf>	from	which	the	Copyright	Royalty	Board	derives	its	statutory	authority.		In	
Canada	see	Copyright Act,	supra	note	38	at	s.	66	and	foll.	(establishing	the	Copyright	Board	of	Canada).		
172.	 So	named	because	of	Justice	Story’s	famous	decision	in	Folsom v March	(US	1st	Cir,	1841),	9	Federal Cases	
342	[Folsom v March].	
173.	 Folsom v March,	supra	note	172	at	p.	348.
174.	 US Copyright Act,	supra	note	8	at	s.	107.	The	three	other	criteria	are	the	purpose	and	character	of	the	use,	
including	whether	such	use	is	of	a	commercial	nature	or	is	for	nonprofit	educational	purposes;	the	nature	of	
the	copyrighted	work;	and	the	amount	and	substantiality	of	the	portion	used	in	relation	to	the	copyrighted	
work	as	a	whole.	
175.	 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises (USA	SC,	1985),	<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/
getcase.pl?court=us&vol=471&invol=539>,	471	United States Supreme Court Reports	539.	The Nation	
magazine	had	obtained	an	unauthorized	copy	of	the	soon-to-be	published	manuscript	of	the	memoirs	of	
ex-president	Gerald	Ford.	It	quoted	300	words	from	the	memoirs.	The Nation	claimed	that	the	relatively	
small	taking	was	fair	use.	The	district	court	found	that	the	use	of	the	material	was	infringing,	which	was	
reversed	by	a	2-1	decision	of	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Second	Circuit.	The	focus	at	the	Supreme	Court	
(based	on	Folsom v March,	supra	note	172)	was	on	whether	the	fair	use	superseded	the	use	of	the	original.
176.	 Harper & Row Publishers,	supra	note	175	at	p.	566.
177.	 Harper & Row Publishers, supra note	175	at	p.	567.	
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Us	fair	use	jurisprudence	shows	that	at	least	the	second	step	of	the	test	
may	be	used	by	national	courts.	It	acts	as	a	proxy	for	determining	fairness	of	the	
use.	 perhaps	 this	 will	mean	 broader	 application	 of	 Us	 fair	 use	 cases	 in	 other	
jurisdictions.	a	similar	situation	occurred	with	respect	to	originality	after	the	Us	
supreme	 Court	 found	 in	 a	 1991	 case178	 that	 a	 modicum	 of	 creativity	 was	
constitutionally	required	to	benefit	from	copyright	protection.179	
*
4. ConCLusIon : ThE WAy forWArD
historically, authors’ rights were anchored	in	the	public	interest,	one	that	requires	
a	working	copyright	system	for	the	benefit	of	authors	and	users	of	copyright	works.	
The	 public	 interest	 requires	 a	 balance,	 one	 that	may	 impose	 limits	 on	 exclusive	
copyright	 rights.	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 this	 principle	 has	 formed	part	 of	 the	
normative	framework	since	before	the	inception	of	the	Berne Convention	in	1886,	
which	recognizes,	for	example,	the	quotation	right	(as	a	mandatory	exception)	and	
the	rights	of,	broadly	speaking,	a	free	press.	as	rights	were	added	to	the	Convention,	
normative	work	on	limitations	and	exceptions	remained	largely	non-systematic	and	
conceptually	 unsatisfactory.	 The	 situation	 has	 now	become	much	more	 complex	
owing	to	the	emergence	and	increasing	presence	of	copyright	in	the	private	sphere	
of	users	and	consumers,	and	the	new	role	of	users	in	generating	and	disseminating	
“content.”	Those	users	have	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	privacy	or	rights	contained	
in	 consumer	 protection	 statutes,	 that	 clash	 with	 copyright.	 new	 equilibria,	 both	
within	copyright	and	in	relation	to	these	other	bodies	of	law,	must	be	found.	This	
article	has	tried	to	offer	a	context	for	the	formulation	of	limitations	and	exceptions	
at	 the	 international	 level	 and	 a	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 principles	 that	 should	
undergird	such	limitations	and	exceptions.	
	Those	principles	should	first	be	operationalized	in	a	new	international	
protocol	that	could	be	negotiated	to	recognize	both	mandatory	and	declaratory	
limitations	 and	exceptions,	 thus	providing	guidance	on	 the	 interpretation	 and	
application	of	 the	 three-step	 test.180	 This	 instrument	would	 list	 the	 underlying	
principles	 of	 limitations	 and	 exceptions	 in	 a	 preamble,	 provide	 for	 specific	
exceptions	 in	 a	 few	 provisions,	 and	 state	 compatibility	 with	 (and	 possible	
interpretation	of)	the	three-step	test	in	an	accompanying	statement.	
second,	 the	WTO	could	adopt	 a	Ministerial	Declaration,	 at	 least	with	
respect	to	the	exceptions	that	apply	more	directly	to	developing	countries.	for	
instance	 the	 1971	 appendix	 to	 the	 Berne Convention	 contains	 a	 series	 of	
administrative	 measures,	 few	 of	 which	 are	 required	 to	 meet	 the	 underlying	
developmental	 objectives	 and	 safeguard	 the	 rightsholders’	 interests.	 a	
Declaration	could	state,	for	example,	that	WTO	Members	will	not	use	the	WTO	
178.	 Feist Publications, Inc.	v Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.	(USA	SC,	1991),	<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/
scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=499&invol=340>,	499	United States Supreme Court Reports	340.	
179.	 See	Daniel	Gervais,	“Feist	Goes	Global:	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	the	Notion	of	Originality	in	Copyright	
Law,”	(2002)	49	Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA	949–981,	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=733603#PaperDownload>.	
180.	 P	Bernt	Hugenholtz	&	Ruth	L	Okediji,	Conceiving An International Instrument On Limitations And 
Exceptions To Copyright: Final Report	(6	March	2008),	<http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/
limitations_exceptions_copyright.pdf>.	
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dispute-settlement	mechanism	in	respect	of	violations	of	those	unessential	parts	
of	 the	 appendix	 (thereby	 making	 it	 easier	 and	 simpler	 to	 use).	 easier	 and	
broader	use	of	the	appendix	may	prompt	rightsholders,	especially	publishers,	to	
respond	better	to	the	needs	of	the	developing	world.	
Third,	 a	 set	 of	 principles	 could	 be	 developed	 to	 explicate	 the	 issues	
arising	from	the	unregulated	nature	of	the	policy	space	reserved	for	limitations	
and	 exceptions,	 and	 to	 provide	 information	 and	 guidance	 to	 national	 policy	
makers	and	courts.	This	would	be	helpful	in	light	of	not	only	extant	state	practice	
but	also	of	emerging	understandings	about	the	impact	of	a	properly	calibrated	
intellectual	 property	 regime	 to	 stimulate	 domestic	 innovation	 policies	 and	
cultural	development,	including	the	amelioration	of	educational	systems.181	
Operationally,	as	a	number	of	countries	have	begun	doing,	 the	 three-
step	 test	 could	be	 used	 to	 craft	 limitations	 and	 exceptions	 that	 allow	use	 for	
public	interest	purposes	that	do	not	demonstrably	affect	commercial	exploitation.	
When	 a	 substantial	 loss	 of	 income	 can	 be	 shown	 to	 exist	 or	 be	 reasonably	
foreseen	based	on	 relevant	experiences	 in	other	 jurisdictions	as	a	 result	of	an	
exception,	 then	 a	 compensation	 mechanism	 can	 be	 put	 in	 place.	 exceptions	
based	on	articles	10	and	10bis	of	 the	Berne Convention	as	well	as	exclusions	
based	on	articles	2	and	2bis	of	the	Convention	would	remain	unaffected	by	the	
test	and	the	need	to	provide	for	compensation.	
as	 a	 political	 matter,	 because	 the	 objectives	 of	 defining	 proper	
limitations	and	exceptions	are	not	incompatible	with	the	fight	against	commercial	
piracy,	the	two	issues	could	be	joined	in	a	single	new	instrument	with	a	view	to	
increasing	enforcement	measures	available	against	“pirates,”182	while	recognizing	
the	principles	and	application	of	 limitations	and	exceptions.	This	 type	of	dual-
purpose	 instrument	 would	 be	 a	 forceful	 refocusing	 of	 copyright	 on	 its	 core	
mission	and	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	originally	designed.
as	a	parallel	set	of	measures,	especially	in	grey	areas	that	are	likely	to	
lead	 to	 heavy	 litigation	 (especially	 in	 cases	 where	 revenue	 streams	 could	 be	
affected),	 contractual	 solutions	 could	 be	 encouraged,	 notably	 by	 furthering	
international	 research	 in	 this	 area.	 In	 broad-ranging	 licensing	 agreements,	
including	recourse	to	extended	collective	repertoires	(which	essentially	transforms	
a	collective	scheme	from	opt-in	to	opt-out	and	seems	compatible	with	both	the	
Berne Convention	 and	TrIps183),	parties	could	agree	 to	disagree	on	 the	exact	
scope	 of	 an	 exception	 and/or	 the	 three-step	 test	 but	 agree	 to	 pay	 both	 a	
licensing	fee	for	uses	that	require	an	authorization	and	a	(discounted)	fee	for	the	
grey	area	possibly	covered	by	the	exception.	Logically,	in	countries	where	such	a	
mechanism	 is	 available,184	 governmental	 authorities	 setting	 collective	 tariffs	
181.	 See	generally	Daniel	Gervais,	ed.	Intellectual Property, Trade and Development	(Oxford	University	Press,	2007).	
182.	 As	was	done	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	supra	note	5	at	art.	61,	I	refer	here	to	those	who	infringe	copyright	
knowingly	and	on	a	commercial	scale.		
183.	 See	Daniel	Gervais,	“Application	of	an	Extended	Collective	Licensing	Regime	in	Canada:	Principles	and	
Issues	Related	to	Implementation,”	(Study	prepared	for	the	Department	of	Canadian	Heritage)	(2003)	
<http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/regime/regime_e.pdf>	.
184.	 For	example	the	Copyright	Board	of	Canada	determined	the	scope	of	the	research	and	educational	
exceptions	in	a	decision	concerning	a	tariff	filed	by	the	reprography	collective	Access	Copyright	for	certain	
educational	uses.	See	statement of Royalties to be Collected by Access Copyright for the Reprographic 
Reproduction, in Canada, of Works in its Repertoire (Educational Institutions—2005-2009),	Decision	of	26	
June	2009,	corrected	on	17	July	2009,	<http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/2009/Access-Copyright-2005-
2009-Schools.pdf>.	At	para.	89,	the	Board	noted:	“Research	occurs	provided	that	effort	is	put	into	finding,	
regardless	of	its	nature	or	intensity.”
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could	take	account	of	both	exceptions	and	the	three-step	test,	and	adapt	tariffs	
to	reflect	the	exceptions	appropriately.
naturally	these	three	ways	forward	are	not	mutually	exclusive.
